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Recent price surges have caught the attention of the entire society, and have put food 
reserve policy back into the political spotlight.  However, few studies have investigated the 
operation of a grain reserve on a global scale. Therefore, the objectives of my research are to 
model and compare alternative operational price bands of an international grain reserve, and 
determine the relative feasibility and impact of the alternative price bands.  
A global economic model was modified by building the capability to analyze alternative 
price bands of an international grain reserve. The feasibility of alternative price-band scenarios 
were evaluated by comparing: 1) their relative effectiveness of adjusting market prices to within 
the price bands; 2) the quantity of grain needed to be adjusted; 3) the cost of fulfilling the project 
goal; 4) and the impact on global market trade. Each of these elements will be discussed below. 
According to the results, the international grain reserve demonstrated a reverse 
relationship with world reference prices, strong effectiveness to support prices above an 
established lower price bound, a certain effectiveness to eliminate extreme high prices, and a 
relatively feasible cost to operate.  As the international grain reserve operates longer, its ability 
of eliminating extreme high prices becomes greater and the potential quantity of accumulated 
reserve stocks grows. The international grain reserve program with paralleled price band tends to 
have a stable or slightly decreasing cost over time. 
In determining the appropriate price band of an international reserve, the primary 
objective for initiating a reserve should be considered. If the primary objective is to protect 
consumer’s welfare, the model results suggest that the upper price bound should not be set too 
low to invalidate the programs’ ability to avoid extreme high prices; if the primary objective is to 
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support producer’s income, the model results indicate that a price band with a relatively low 
upper price bound would help to make the reserve program sustainable. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
The 25-year downward trend of the real price of food met a sharp reversal beginning in 
2006 (Demeke 2009). Prices of nearly all agricultural commodities had increased significantly, 
as seen from Table 1 (see in APPENDIX): for rice by 181%, wheat by 96%, and corn by 160% 
between January 2006 to July 2008 (Gilbert 2010). This was especially true in the first three 
months of 2008 as “international nominal prices of all major food commodities reached their 
highest levels in nearly 50 years, while prices in real terms were the highest in nearly 30 years" 
(FAO 2008a).  
This price surge—generally called "2007/2008 World Food Prices Crisis"—ended in 
mid-2008 along with a sudden drop in fuel prices. However, after only one year of lower prices, 
another food price surge emerged. The FAO Global Food Price Monitor in March 2011(see in 
Figure 1 in APPENDIX) shows that the FFPI (FAO Food Price Index) surpassed its earlier peak 
of early summer 2008 by December 2010, and hit a new record high in February 2011—the 
highest in both real and nominal terms since January 1990 (FAO 2011a). Though the dynamics 
of high commodity prices in 2011 were different from the period in 2006 to 2008, corn prices 
still returned to the peak levels of June 2008, wheat and rice prices were at about 65% of 2008 
peak levels, but were still higher than in the 2000-2005 period (Abbott 2011). 
The two food crises mentioned above struck poor households all over the world, 
especially in low-income countries as well as import-dependent countries. Grains account for a 
large proportion of the diet of poor households, which is about 63% in Asia, 60% in North Africa 
and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS—11 former Soviet republics),  and 43% in Latin 
America (Rosen 2008). So rising food prices affects the poor directly. For instance, food 
consumption of the poor in Ethiopia fell by almost 20% during the 2007/2008 food crisis 
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(Ulimwengu 2009). This rising price pushed 40 million people, all over the world, into hunger 
from 2007 to 2008 (FAO 2008). Especially in countries where staple food prices had risen 
rapidly, undernourishment increased by between 2-3% up to Feb 2010 (Food Price Watch 
Dec2010).  An additional 44 million people, in low-income and middle-income countries, fell 
below the $1.25 poverty line as a result of higher food prices from June 2010 to April 2011 
(FAO 2011b). 
Food aid, which is essential for many recipient countries, was more costly to purchase 
and to transport. Food aid agencies, such as the World Food Program (WFP), not only had 
trouble meeting the increasing need in import-dependent countries, but even encountered 
difficulties in maintaining their current level of assistance (FAO 2009a). The gap between need 
and supply was larger. One statistical result showed that in the Horn of Africa there were more 
than an estimated 12 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA 2011). Severe 
food shortages, in some districts without timely and adequate relief, caused social turmoil that 
made things worse. For example, the Russian embargo abolished a big wheat deal with Egypt, 
which is the world's third largest importers of wheat, driving up Egypt's wheat price immediately 
and led to a political crisis, indirectly, in 2011 (Thomson 2011).  
Since rising food prices had created a range of macro vulnerabilities and resulted in 
alerting the entire world that food security was under a severe threat (Ramalingam 2008). That 
drew the attention of politicians, traders, and researchers who were exploring its causes and 
impact. A review of the causes of price increase is presented below. 
1) From the macroeconomic view, the depreciation of the U.S. dollar against the EURO 
and most Asian currencies was one of the main contributors of the increasing prices of 
commodities most of which were denominated by U.S. dollars (FAO 2008b). Rising oil prices, 
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which rose agricultural production costs in domestic energy, fertilizer, irrigation, and 
transportation, made the situation more critical (ADB 2008). Speculation on food commodities 
was also assumed to be a contributor by some researchers, while its impact on food prices was 
not clear since it was hard to quantify (Gilbert 2007).  
2) On the demand side, food and feed crop consumption expanded in those years as the 
population and economies of developing countries grew rapidly. As incomes grew rapidly, more 
grain-intensive livestock and poultry products were consumed by people who were buying more 
expensive foods (Brown 2011). However, the 1.7% growth in global grain consumption 
(excluding biofuels) from 2000 to 2007 was roughly balanced by the 1.3% growth in yields and 
0.4% in harvest area (Mitchell 2008).  
3) On the supply side, policies were created in some major exporting countries, such as 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Vietnam, in order to ensure 
enough food supply for their domestic populations (Vokes 2010). Their strict export bans, high 
tariffs, and the blocking of the export of wheat, rice and other foodstuffs, caused higher prices 
and serious food shortages for the net food importing nations (Issacharoff 2009). Many of these 
were also low-income countries (Ng 2009). In 2006, the food import bill in developing countries 
increased 10% over 2005. In 2007, the percentage increase was even larger, being an estimated 
25% (Rosen 2008).  
4) Another controversial debate concerns the impact of the diversion of food crops and 
substitution of food cropland to biofuel feedstock on the food price crisis (Rosegrant 2008).  The 
biofuel expansion in the U.S. and the E.U. was assessed by many researchers as the primary 
factor causing the “2007/2008 food price crisis”. One evidence was that the proportion of corn 
used to produce bioethanol in the US, which counted for 60% of global corn exports, had 
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increased from 6% of total production to 23% from 2006 to 2008 (Rahman 2008).  In 2007, more 
than 100 million tons of grain was estimated to have been pulled out of the food market and 
processed into ethanol in U.S. But some researchers disagreed with the ethanol critics because 
the rising yield and the utility of the by-product of biofuel production was usually overlooked 
(Tenenbaum 2008).  
5) Frequently, severe weather disasters, possibly caused by climate changes (Francis 
1998), were identified as major factors leading to reduced crop supply levels for many major 
exporters. This was true especially in Australia, the U.S., the E.U., Canada, Russia,  Ukraine 
(OECD-FAO 2007), and also in parts of South Asia (Timmer 2008). In 2007, the drought 
reduced Australian rice production by 98%, causing a global rice shortage and doubling rice 
prices in over three months (Bradsher 2008). The World Bank estimated that the drought may 
also have reduced world total wheat supplies by 4% (Mitchell, 2008). In 2010, Russia 
experienced the worst drought in 20 years, destroying 40% of the country's wheat crop. A grain 
embargo was set to meet the emergency (Mayer 2010). Because the embargo shut off the world's 
third wheat exporter, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) wheat contracts rose by 6.6 percent by 
August, which was the highest increase since September of 2008 (Hernandez 2010). In early 
2011, a severe drought struck China affecting more than 19 million acres of winter wheat in the 
provinces that accounted for 42.4 percent of the total output from those regions, making wheat 
prices hit a two-year high (UPI 2011). 
The balance of this chapter will deal with some historical attempts, made by various 
groups, to create food reserves, in order to check the increasing volatility in food prices and 
availability. It is clear that there was a revival of interest, among political circles, to establish an 
international grain reserve, during the years between 2008 and 2001.  
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In August 2008, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) announced that 
it would establish a Regional Food Reserve Facility. At the same time, they urged the member 
states not to impose export restrictions on maize (IRIN 2010). In the same month, the 15th South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit, held in Colombo, brought up the 
Colombo Statement on Food Security, which called for greater regional cooperation to “ensure 
food availability and nutrition security in South Asia”. On October 15, 2009, an event was hosted 
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC concerning the potential 
of instituting a series of global food reserves (FWR 2010). At the World Summit on Food 
Security, held at the FAO Headquarters in November, 2009, many countries suggested that an 
internationally coordinated physical food reserve system might be necessary in the future (FAO 
2009). In March 2010, the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), which account for 
25 percent of the world's land and 40 percent of the world's people, met in Moscow and agreed to 
support the establishment of a system of national grain reserves. In the same month, the U.N. met 
in Dublin, Ireland, to discuss the global food crisis and explore the potential of food reserves in 
order to address hunger and stabilize agricultural markets (IFAPT 2010). And the G-20 met in 
November 2011 to discuss the potential of grain reserves was discussed. This meeting was the 
result of recent evidence which indicated that China’s large national grain reserves has alleviated 
the food shortage caused by the once-in-a-century drought in early 2011 (Harkness 2011). 
Though political interest in initiating an international food reserve is growing to date, 
there are few studies or economic models exploring its management feasibility and market 
impacts. Specifically, proper price bands need to be analyzed, which would allow the reserve to 
fulfill the policy goal as well as have a reasonable cost.  
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This thesis will review the history, theories, and past analyses concerning grain reserve 
programs. The objectives of my research are to model and compare alternative operational price 
bands of an international grain reserve, and determine the relative feasibility and impact of the 
alternative price bands. A global economic model will be modified by building the capability to 
analyze alternative price bands of an international grain reserve. Using the modified model, five 
alternative price-band scenarios will be simulated. The feasibility of alternative price-band 
scenarios will be evaluated. 
.  
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 History Review of Food Reserves 
Reserve programs which coexist with many other programs, such as producer subsidy 
programs, “set-aside”, and “loan rate”, have been playing a practical role in food security 
strategy in all the countries since civilization began. As far back as the Biblical story of Joseph 
and the granaries of Egypt, we have seen the desirable activity of insuring the future (Porter 
1950). 
1) Food Reserves of the United States 
Historically, the major objectives of food reserves has been the pursuit of domestic price 
stability, enhancing domestic food sufficiency, and providing humanitarian aid within a nation or 
among the nations. 
For the United States, several food reserve policies have been set up in different historic 
periods, and some of them were repealed due to different reasons. In 1929, the Federal Farm 
Board was created as a stabilization corporation to limit agricultural sales and guarantee farmers 
fair prices by purchasing surpluses of corn, wheat, cotton and other commodities, storing them in 
a government-sponsored grain storage system or exporting them abroad (Ray 2009). However, 
the Federal Farm Board soon spent all the $500 million dollars allocated by congress. The 
program was abolished by President Roosevelt, in 1933, due to its inability to control the 
spiraling farm price situation which was propelled by the relentless recession during the Great 
Depression, and a lack of authority to control production (Edsforth 2000). 
It was quickly replaced by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), which was 
authorized by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and 1938. This act stressed an "ever-
normal granary" to purchase and accumulate surpluses in government-funded storage during the 
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"the fat years" for release, and used during "the lean years"(USDA 2009). A "commodity farm 
programs" was established to provide non-recourse loans, direct purchasing, storage and reserve 
with the goal of "parity" price in response to the overproduction of goods which had occurred 
during the depression (Ray 2008). However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, government 
stocks were deliberately sold off as a result of over accumulated stocks which were burdensome 
for the government (Ray 2009). 
The world food crisis of the early 1970s brought price stabilization once again to the 
forefront of political consciousness. In the "Food and Agriculture Act of 1977", Farmer-Owned 
Reserve (FOR) program was set up, as a buffer stock program operated by the farmers instead of 
the government (Ray 2009). FOR was an extended loan program covering a period of up to three 
years and creating a "price band" with the lower bound defined by a non-recourse-like loan rate 
and upper bound defined by a release price (Hart 2000). The program reserved redundant 
supplies when the market price was lower than the loan rate, and released when the market price 
was higher than upper bound; a "call" price was also specified, in which the Secretary of 
Agriculture could force the release of stocks onto the market (Knutson 1998).  
An early report estimated that the net increase of FOR stocks in the first 3 years caused a 
roughly 4-percent increase in corn and wheat prices (Gardner 1981). As Figure 2 (Hart 2000of 
the annual corn price during the FOR's existence show, 1) in the high price years, though market 
prices exceed the call price on some occasions, the annual average corn price exceeded the 
release price only once, which was in 1980; 2) in the low price years, average farm prices fell 
below the loan rate several times, but farm prices stay close to loan rate (Hard 2000). In 1983, 
the buffer stock program worked well when U.S. corn yields were disastrously low due to the 
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combination of the payment-in-kind (PIK) program plus a drought, the existence of buffer stocks 
prevented a major damage in the domestic and export grain markets (Meyers 1988). 
However, after conducting several modifications since 1981, the Federal Agricultural 
Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act in 1996 repealed this program.  
In addition to the supply and price stabilizing programs, reserves for food emergency 
release have also existed for decades. For example, the Food Security Wheat Reserve in 1980, 
Food Security Commodity Reserve in 1996, and the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust in 1998 
were all established to meet emergency food aid requirements within states or for overseas as 
stated in the "Public Law 480" (P.L. 480) in the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance 
Act of 1954 (USDA 2006).  
2) Food Reserves of China 
In the rice-based economies of Asia, policy-makers have been more concerned about 
stability of domestic prices rather than their level relative to world prices (Timmer 1989).  
Food reserves in China have a long history of almost 4000 years and have always been 
regarded as the most important food security strategy of the country (Wang 2002). In fact, the 
item "Ever-Normal Granary", in Wallace's reserve policy, came from the ancient practice of the 
Chinese (Bodde 1948) which has been operating as one of the most crucial policies for more than 
2000 years, back to Han dynasty. The basic concepts of the food reserve policy  included two 
reserves systems: 1) a nationwide coordinate reserve system for emergency use; and 2) local 
reserves for price stabilization. There is even an old saying that, "A country can only survive 
when it has enough food storage for the next three years". Although building up and maintaining 
such large reserves was always difficult, historic materials do show several successful examples 
in “keeping reserve levels stable for considerable periods of time” (Rawski 1992). In 1990, the 
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People's Republic of China reformed the food reserve system with county level reserves, city 
level reserves, province level reserves and country special reserves (Liu 2003). 
Food policy in China always persists in self-support and self-sufficiency. Though food 
import increased significantly since 1990s, the food reserve amount in China is maintained at 
around 0.15 to 0.2 billion tons. The reserve holds the self-support ratio above 95% with the 
exception of certain years, and keeps inventory-sale ratio at about 35%, which is much higher 
than the warning level (17-18%) of food security defined by the FAO (National Development 
and Reform Committee of China 2009).  
The national grain reserve system, strong disaster relief programs, and large scale food-
for-work schemes, contributed substantially to the stability of China's food supply and access to 
food for the poor (FAO 1998).In the 2007/2008 global food crisis, China, as well as other Asian 
countries with reserve stocks, was able to respond more quickly and cheaply than those with 
limited or no reserves (Demeke 2008). As recently as late 2010 and early 2011, the Chinese 
government released 8.5 million tons of state-reserved grain and cooking oil to ensure that 
market supply met demand (NDRCC 2010). According to Ping Zhang, the minister of the 
National Development and Reform Commission, the reserve had reached 40 percent of annual 
consumption by early 2011 (NDRCC 2011).  
2.2 Negative Arguments 
Food reserve history has shown its timely effort to mitigate food shortage and price crisis. 
However, many reserves have failed to be sustained as policy. The Federal Farm Board went 
bankrupt, and FOR which was repealed in the 1996 U.S. Farm Bill also failed. The reasons of 
these failures and the nature behind this economic behavior should be carefully assessed. 
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Some lessons can be taken from the operation failures. 1) The benefits of the reserves for 
consumers and producers may be less than the costs of the stabilization programs which 
sometimes become quite burdensome for both government and taxpayers (Gardner 1981), 
especially under an increasing inventory (Lind 2001). One model result showed that the reserve 
is not as financially feasible a method as free trade in maintaining a food security program for 
people living at the margin of adequate nutrition. 2) It is difficult to run a multi-crop stabilization 
policy over time involving different target prices because producers tend to plant the crop with 
the highest relative price (Hart 2000). 3) In a reserve program,  farmers are not willing to release 
stock until the price reaches the releasing price because they expect more profit (Hart 2000). 4) 
The easy corruption in reserve institutions may also be an obstacle to the reserve operation. An 
example of this was the defalcation of ADMARC (a food reserve experiment supported by FAO 
and UNDP/SEPED between August 2000 and January 2001 in Malawi) which left the reserve 
inadequate in facing the food shortage (IMF 2002). 5) Backward infrastructure and irrational 
coordination systems, in some developing countries like China, impeded their existing food 
reserves from functioning effectively (Wu 2011). 
Aside from operational issues, the rationality of the food reserve system has also been 
questioned. 1) Not all macroeconomic consequences for stabilizing food prices are positive if 
one considers its destabilization on foreign-exchange requirements, the credit system, money 
supply and budget allocations (Pinckney 1988). The government food reserve may interrupt and 
substitute the function of the free market because prices are a signal of the scarcity of goods and 
a guide for resource allocation (Hayek 1945). One example is that with government reserves 
production may continually increase while the producer prices, in the long run, may decrease 
because of the producer s’ feedback on less future risk (Holt 1994). Another example is that if 
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the FOR had never existed, commercial and private stocks probably would have built up before 
1983 and 1988 according to the market prices, and partially offset the price impact of these short 
crop years (Hart 2000). As shown in Figure 3 (Hui 2009), the commercial reserve revived after 
the repeal of FOR in 1996. 2) The price stabilization may interrupt the “natural insurance” for 
producers which could support producers’ income by the negative correlation between prices 
(Newbery and Stiglitz 1984). That means when the harvest is lower, producers’ income will be 
insured because prices would be relatively higher; but when prices are lower, producers’ income 
will be insured because the harvest is usually generally higher.  
Developing food productivity, providing consumer subsidies, reducing tariffs, and many 
other common measures are regarded as cheaper intervention policies to solve the problem of 
rising food prices (Demeke 2008) compared with costly food reserves. International trade is also 
regarded as a proper alternative policy instrument for food security, due to the problems with the 
current reserve policies as stated above (Sekhar 2004). For example, compared with the 
advantages of expanding export, the shortcomings of granary operation may be one of the 
reasons FOR was repealed (Ray 2010). Recently, a virtual reserve mechanism, which could buy 
and sell future contracts to regulate price, was also proposed as a much easier alternative to a real 
reserve in keeping stocks for security purposes (Lind 2001). 
2.3 Positive Arguments 
Some studies showed that consistently greater producer surplus or consumer surplus can 
only be achieved when prices in the international market are relatively stable. One model’s 
results suggested that risk-averse countries tend to limit trade under scenarios of price 
uncertainty (Sekhar 2004). Proper public price stabilization intervention is both desirable and 
feasible for the international markets, and especially necessary for developing countries (Galtier 
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2011). Given the reality of widespread market failures, neither neo-classical school theories nor 
the structuralism school theories, on food price policies, are accepted by policy-makers as 
beneficial to developing countries (Behrman 1981). Indeed, a research project in India concluded 
that imperfections in risk and capital markets combined with substantial price fluctuations, for a 
commodity, had significant adverse externalities and non-Pareto-maintaining welfare 
consequences (Pradhan 1988). Other research showed that food security, in developing countries, 
could be substantially improved by more advanced policy reforms, since agro-ecological 
approaches can only offer limited promise for improving yields (Rosegrant 2003).  
Compared with many other food intervention policies that address food security, food 
reserves are costly, but important measures for preserving food security. The reasons that the 
reserve program is important will be explained below. 
1) Other alternatives that address food security and price stabilization also have their 
shortcomings. One example of this fact is that the changing of the volumes of import and export 
in order to stabilize domestic price does not help stabilize the food import or export bill, thus the 
volumes will be less related to fluctuations in international prices and easily decoupled with the 
world market (Ulrich 1986). Private risk-management instruments did not “come to fruition”, 
and the “natural insurance” failed to prevent the deterioration of the nutritional condition of the 
most vulnerable households (Galtier 2009). Though a virtual reserve is cheap and simple to 
administer, it cannot provide real food. "Finance fund is only a guarantee that the country can 
buy as much food as that amount of money at a given time; the actual volume of food the money 
will buy will fluctuate because food prices fluctuate." (Murphy 2009) 
2) Food reserves actually may not be more expensive that other intervention policies. In 
industrialized countries, the cost of maintaining small physical reserves would provide less 
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budgetary strain than many of the current subsidy programs (Willoughby 2009). For example, 
the Farmer-owned Reserve program, which cost millions, is actually cheaper than the new farm 
programs later which cost billions (Ray 2004). 
3) Even though food reserve that addresses the need for reliable emergency food supplies 
and prevents excessive speculation in food markets can be costly, they still have large positive 
net returns given the losses created by a food prices crisis (Braun 2008). A storage/stabilization 
program may be socially worthwhile despite measured private benefit/cost ratios less than 1 
(Gardner 1981). 
4) A food reserve might be preferred is to avoid a crisis caused by insufficient of food. 
This is even more important than fixing the price. The "right to food" is more important than the 
"right to trade" and should be regarded as the central objective (De La Terre Ugarte 2009). It 
does seem that shortages of raw materials are an important factor in many cases (Porter 1950). 
For instance, fear of food shortages, not the average level of food prices, in urban areas can 
evoke universal and visceral reactions that induce anti-government riots (Timmer 2009).  
5) A reserve program is a multi-purpose method to cope with multiple challenges. During 
more and more common financial and economic shocks, job loss and scarce credit can limit 
farmers' and poor people's income, and therefore limit food consumption, diet quality, and 
spending on health and general welfare in the future (Braun 2009). Moreover, the negative 
influence of global warming, extreme weather events, as well as epidemic outbreaks (including 
human disease, and crop and livestock disease) will further exacerbate food insecurity. These 
problems would most likely spread faster with urbanization and globalization (Nelson 2009). 
Food reserve programs would limit these bad situations by providing emergency release or 
humanitarian aid, as well as limiting excessive prices in order to protect consumers' interest, and 
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supporting food prices to ensure farmers' incomes. Given the protection characteristic, reserves 
can help stabilize future markets, and therefore, provide confidence and incentives for 
investments in farms (Sampson 2010). 
6) A virtually irreducible minimal level of reserve is essential to price stability since 
guarantees the efficient operation of transport, marketing and processing in the global 
agricultural market (Bobenrieth 2009). The results of one reserve analysis reviewed that when 
prices are at a high level and reserves are at minimal level, the consumption response to prices 
becomes very inelastic (Cafiero 2009). That means food reserves are like safety-belts preventing 
prices from wildly increasing.  
Therefore, food security would be extremely vulnerable if the significance of food 
reserves was neglected. In fact, the 2007/2008 food price crisis was just one example of this. The 
chronic decreasing world food stock was assessed to be one of the driving forces of long-term 
declining prices trend, and also one of the triggers of the prices peaks the world experienced in 
reverse. Timmer (2010) commenting on this situation said, “We are paying a high price, literally, 
for the destocking of grains since the mid-1990s, a process that pushed down prices”. Another 
example of the failure of overlooking the essential meaning of reserve programs happened in 
mid-1970s, when there was an opportunity for the U.S. to sell the large grain reserves which had 
accumulated for more than seven years. The decision to get rid of stocks too soon, too fast, and 
too low at prices was made, at that time, without the expectation of the substantial price increase 
which were more severe in real terms than the 2007/2008 price crisis (Johnson 2009). 
2.4 Climate Change Impact on Agricultural 
As is well-known, agriculture is highly related to local climate and is very sensitive to 
different weather conditions. Among the current challenges reviewed in the introduction of this 
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thesis, there is mounting evidence that climate change is a severe threat to agricultural 
production, and therefore food security. At the UN COP-16 talks in Cancun, Gerald Nelson, co-
author of the report, said, "Climate change represents about 20 percent of the larger challenges of 
food security facing us caused by higher population and income growth in the developing 
world." (Mazhirov 2011) 
Climate change will lead to elevated temperatures, reduced crop-water availability and 
more severe weather events. These changes will have direct influence on crop production 
(Chiotti 1995). However, the overall impact of gradual change is complicated due to various 
factors.  
On one side, compared to current atmospheric  concentrations, crop yields increase at 
550 ppm   in the range of 10-20% for C3 crops and 0-10% for C4 crops (Ainsworth et al. 
2004; Gifford 2004; Long et al. 2004). On the other side, many recent studies confirm and 
extend the Third Assessment Report (TAR) of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) findings that temperature and precipitation changes in future decades will limit direct 
  effects on plants. Generally, potential global food production will increase with increases in 
local average temperature over a range of 1 to 3ºC, but decrease above this range (IPCC 2007).  
Different crops have different sensitivity to climate change, research results indicate 
expected changes of +1.6%, −14.1%, −1.8% for wheat, maize, and barley, with 95% probability 
intervals of (−4.1, +6.7), (−28.0, −4.3), (−11.0, 6.2) in percent of current yields, respectively 
(Tebaldi 2008). Moreover, considering the regional variety, moderate warming benefits crop and 
pasture yields in mid- to high-latitude regions, but even slight warming decreases yields in 
seasonally dry and low-latitude regions (IPCC 2007).  
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If the yield of crops decreases, it may further cause significant changes in markets, food 
prices and supply chain infrastructure (Gregory 2005). The most rapid warming scenario predicts 
that by the end of the century, yields of three major crops in the United States will decrease by 
25-44 % (Schlenkern 2006). Further, the impact of climate change on global agricultural GDP by 
2080 was quantified as between -1.5% and +2.6%, and cereal imports by developing countries 
would rise by 10-40 % (Fischer 2002). A December study from the International Food Policy 
Research Institute shows that global warming may increase the price of corn, wheat, and rice by 
at least two-thirds by 2050 (Nelson 2010).  
Though the impact of gradual change is uncertain, the incidence of extreme weather 
events such as droughts and floods is assessed to increase, with a negative effect on yields in 
developing countries (Easterling 2007). Significant increases are found in the frequency of heavy 
and very heavy precipitation between 1950 and 2003 in British Columbia south of 55°N for 1910 
to 2001, and in other areas as seen in the figure 4 (Groisman 2005). While warming in other 
areas accelerates land surface drying, and increases the potential incidence and severity of 
droughts, which has been observed in many other places worldwide as in figure 5 (IPCC 2007). 
The extreme events will cause abrupt crop yield decline along with many negative influences on 
crop diseases and animal health. For example, the recent two droughts in Russia and China 
affected 20%-40% of each nation's crop production, which directly lead to the increasing food 
price in 2011. 
Therefore, food reserve, as a time-honored method to meet the emergency of weather 




2.5 Recent Developments about an International Food Reserve 
After the 2007/2008 food price crisis, some new developments have been brought up by 
some researchers who are making an effort to put an international food reserve into place.  
1) Highlights of the importance of an International Coordinated Reserve 
A grain reserve program is a complex international issue with strong public good 
elements which require coordinated multilateral solutions (Headey 2009). And the need for the 
cooperation is increasing. 
First, "local food crises" have been predicted to occur in the next decade. The crises 
might be exacerbated by climate change (Evenson 1999), because the arid and semi-arid tropics 
of Asia, Africa and Latin America, where many developing countries are located, have been 
assessed to be more sensitive to climate change (Sivakumar 2005; Rosegrant 2003). Moreover, 
the developed and the developing countries will bear more impact asymmetries due to current 
economic disparity (Rosenzweig 1994; Fischer 2005).  
Second, countries with a high share of food and energy imports are more vulnerable, 
because most of them are developing countries located near the equator. For example, the 
Russian embargo abolished a big wheat deal with Egypt, the world's third largest importer of 
wheat. It directly drove up Egypt's wheat price and indirectly led to a political crisis (Thomson 
2011).  
Third, a potential shift in production is expected, which will be result in higher trade 
flows from mid- to high-latitude products to the low latitudes (Fischer 2002). The relocation of 
crop production areas would gradually change the domestic and international food market, 
therefore, leading to various challenges for multilateral relationships and international 
coordination. 
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In summary, urgent actions should be taken to create an international food reserve in 
order to support local food security, especially for developing countries.  
2) The Operation of the International Reserve. 
After the 2007/2008 food crisis, similar ideas concerning the operation of a new 
international food reserve were drawn by a few economists (Braun 2009; De La Torre Ugarte 
2009). 
Three approaches for the reserve were recommended. 1) A small physical food reserve of 
around 300,000-500,000 metric tons of basic grains as an emergency reserve would be set. The 
reserve would be primarily supplied by the main grain-producing countries and funded by 
member countries participating in the scheme. 2) A new international coordinated food reserve, 
formed by country-level reserves, could minimize the risk of an individual country’s food crisis, 
achieve grain self-sufficiency, and reduce the total international reserve budget. 3) An innovative 
virtual reserve, as an intervention mechanism, could be found and backed up by a financial fund 
to prevent market price spikes by signaling the market.  
Institutional arrangements should include three sections. 1) A committee should be 
created to be responsible for the international reserve program, which may include the Group of 
Eight Plus Five (G8+5) countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa) plus other major 
exporting countries. 2) A global intelligence unit should be created to be responsible for 
forecasting prices for both the immediate and for future years. It should also design an optimal 
level of public reserve, and maintain a dynamic price band system which would trigger 
interventions in the virtual reserve. 3) A high-level technical commission should be created as a 
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governing body. This commission should be a small multinational agency and should possess 
full decision-making autonomy. 
3) The Region of the International Reserve. 
An International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) has already been proposed to be the 
disposal of World Food Program (WFP) to deal with food crises. However, the IEFR was not 
fully supported by the donors of the WFP since it was difficult to respond rapidly and flexibly to 
emergencies whenever and wherever they occurred (Shaw 2007). As a result, regionalizing such 
a food reserve seemed a more viable alternative. This reserve would be operated by seven 
regions: East and South/Southeast Asia, West Asia and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, South 
America, Oceania, North America, and Europe ("Mission 2014" 2010). Another suggestion was 
that the physical reserves might be located near food insecure areas or calamity prone regions 
(Willoughby 2009). 
In conclusion, an international food reserve could be a valid policy instrument with multi-
functionality, including: 
- mitigating severe food shortages and protecting the “right to food”; 
- reducing the probability of excess price surges caused by hoarding, speculation and 
climate change in order to protect the interests of consumers and downstream industries;  
- supporting prices, and therefore supporting farmers’ income, reducing poverty, and 
improving the performance of the local food supply system; 
- enhancing healthy supply response and investment in agriculture by stabilizing prices, 
and preventing the collapse of confidence in the international grain market; 
- encouraging cooperating nations to meet the worldwide and local emergencies jointly. 
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2.6 Modeling an International Grain Reserve 
Efforts have been made to simulate an international grain reserve since the 1950s.  
Some models focused on exploring optimal reserve size. Eaton, Steele, Cohon and 
ReVelle (1976) developed a multi-objective linear programming method to determine the 
minimum size of a global grain reserve. The model characterized past production patterns by the 
“fitting method” and by statistical analysis in order to simulate possible future situations. Then a 
reserve sizing method was used to generate the tradeoff curves between food security and reserve 
size. Order statistics method was used to evaluate the reliability of reserve sizes and to select the 
number of synthetic futures for sizing analysis. The results suggested that 172 million metric 
tons or fourteen percent of the total 1974 world grain harvests could completely stabilize the 
levels of grain available for food security use.  
Some models focused on exploring proper production range bounds. Reutlinger, Eaton, 
and Bigman (1957) developed a model for evaluating the efficiency, equity, trade, and 
stabilization impact of grain reserves on developing countries. The model used stochastic 
simulation to transform grain production distributions into distributions of multiple criteria 
situations for evaluating trade and storage policies. It assumed that developing countries were 
“self-sufficient countries”, which meant there would be no incentive to import or export grain in 
normal situations. The storage rules were designed to stabilize grain consumption within a pre-
specified range, i.e., when production was more than the upper consumption band, a desired 
volume of grain would be stored based in available, vacant storage space, and the rest of the 
volume would be exported; when production was less than the lower consumption band, a 
desired volume of grain would be released from the reserve to cover the gap and the volume of 
grain would be imported if the import price was lower than domestic price, at that time.  
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Whitacre and Schmidt (1980) developed a spatial price allocation model (SPA) to assess 
the consistency of a global wheat reserve and the stabilization of wheat prices within the 
framework of a new International Wheat Agreement. The model was composed of sets of linear 
economic relationships between price and quantity. Scenarios were constructed, at the upper and 
lower values of the 90 percent confidence band, around the production trend. The results 
provided an illustrative empirical inquiry into the efficacy of the proposed buffer stock system. 
Some models focused on using price bands as reserve criteria. Cochrane and Danin (1976) 
developed a world grain reserve model with demand functions which were non-stochastic and 
price sensitive, and production functions which were stochastic and completely price inelastic. 
The bounded price rules stated that: when price falls below the lower boundary of the price 
stabilization range, supplies must be reserved in sufficient quantities to hold the price at the 
lower boundary; when price rises above the upper boundary, supplies must be released to the 
extent that they exist in order to hold the price at the upper boundary. The results suggested that 
an average reserve of 50-75 million tons would be adequate for 1975-85 in order to hold the 
annual grain price oscillations within a price range of plus 10 percent or minus 5 percent of the 
target price with a probability of 80-95 percent. 
Schaffer, Hellwinckel, Ray and De La Torre Ugarte (2011) used the POLYSYS model, 
which simulates key economic indicators of major commodities and aggregate agriculture, in the 
US, to study the impact if a reserve program had been in effect in the period of 1998- 2010. The 
model set a loan rate and an upper bound, which is about 160 percent of loan rate. When price 
fell below the loan rate, farmers would receive payment for storing grain; when price exceeded 
160 percent of the loan rate, farmers would release grain into the market until the price fell below 
the bound set-aside program. Set-aside payments were also simulated to assist the reserve 
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program in the model. The results showed that the combination of a reserve program and the 
land set-aside would significantly reduce the level of government payments. 
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CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A reserve program should have the ability to stabilize prices, thereby, eliminating price 
extremes. When the prices are less than the lower price bound, the reserve should reserve a 
certain quantity of commodity in order to decrease available stocks in the market. This will pull 
the price up to the price band. When prices are higher than upper price bound, the reserve should 
release a certain quantity of its stocks in order to draw price back to the price band. 
To model the international grain reserve so that it fulfills its role in adjusting prices, some 
fundamental conceptions should be explained. 
1) Demand and Supply function 
The fundamental theory of food reserve, relies on the fact that the demand quantity and 
supply quantity of a good, can both be represented as functions of market price, mathematically: 
  	
 , where  is the demand quantity; 
  	
  , where  is the supply quantity. 
2) Price Elasticity 
A change in the sensitivity of demand or supply quantity, with respect to the market price, 
can be revealed by their price elasticity. Different crops have different price elasticity in demand 
and supply, mathematically: 
   ∆/∆/   , where  is the price elasticity of demand,  is the original demand 
quantity, ∆ is the change of demand quantity, 	 is the original market price, and ∆	 is the 
change of price; 
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  ∆/∆/     , where   is the price elasticity of supply,  is the original supply 
quantity, ∆ is the change of supply quantity, 	 is the original market price, and ∆	 is the 
change of price. 
3) Reserve/ Release Quantity 
Demand and supply curves can be drawn related with the functions and elasticity. Take 
the demands as an example, DD represent the demand curve of a commodity in the Figure 6 
(Porter 1950). 
The determination of reserve quantity is dependent upon the price band the policy sets. 
The price band includes the releasing price (the selling price) and stocking price (the buying 
price).  
If we only consider demand side, as in the Figure 7 (Porter 1950), price OB is set as the 
stocking price, and price OS is set as the releasing price. Given the restrictions of the price band 
between OB and OS, the rational demand quantities will vary between OE and OG. When price 
is low at OP, the quantity EC should be reserved from the market to limit demand, and to raise 
the price to goal OB; while the price is high at OQ, the quantity FG should be released to the 
market to ensure more access to the demand, and lower the price to goal OS.  
The price band should be flexible to avoiding over accumulation or inadequate storage in 
the long run, that is,   ∑   ∑    (Reserve should only be allowed to be slightly 
greater than Release). For example, in years in which the supply is greater than regular situations, 
the price needs to be lower to avoid over accumulation, while in years in which the supply is 
lower than the regular situations, the price need to be higher to avoid inadequate storage. So the 
amount of current and potential reserve/release quantity in return affects the price band.  
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4) Demand and Supply Equilibrium 
Meyers (1981) took price expectation and time into account, a five-equation model of 
commodity reserve which was abstracted from all supply and demand shifters (Meyers 1981). 
The following are the five equations: 
Excess market supply     	   ! " ,  
Domestic and export demand      	
, 
Ending stock demand      	, 
, 
Equilibrium condition       "  !, 
Supply response    	$!  	
, 
where  represents excess market supply, 	 represents supply quantity,  
represents demand quantity,  represents ending free stock,  represents reserve quantity, 
and 	 represents market price. 
5) Price Band 
Setting a “Price band” is a buffer stock scheme which allows prices to fluctuate 
substantially and avoids excess intervention (Knudsen 1990). Realistically, the price band should 
be centered on the long run equilibrium price but not the market price in a given year ( Rahman 
1984) The twofold problem to be solved would be to design reasonable price triggers of 
purchasing and selling with the principles upon which they can change, and to determine the 
right price buffer between the purchasing and selling prices (Porter 1950). 
First, reasonable price triggers should be designed. On one side, as Porter (1950) 
mentioned, the reserving price should not be set too low because it would invalidate its function 
of income support. The releasing price should not be set too high because it would invalidate its 
function of food security. There must also be an emphasis on the sustainability of the releasing 
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price to fulfill the reserve objectives. For example, the releasing price of the U.S. reserve 
program was set to be 115% of the loan rate by CCC at first, but later it was changed to be higher 
by FOR program to help the program operate easier. The excess releasing price resulted in over 
accumulated stock and hampered FOR’s ability to reduce price variability (Salathe 1984).  
On the other side, the reserving price should not be set too high in order to avoid frequent 
compensation, and also to encourage excessive production. When the reserving price is too high 
the program costs can become very high resulting in bankruptcy of the reserve agency when it 
meets with excess production for a sufficient long time (Knudsen 1990). Likewise, the releasing 
price should not be set too low in order to avoid frequent price reductions, which would reduce 
the total profit of farmers.  
Second, the buffer width should not be too narrow or too wide. Holt (1994) showed that 
as the buffer width was narrowed, expected production would be greater while expected market 
and producer prices would be lower within the band. The higher production and the lower prices 
were due to the risk reduction associated with the "squeezing" of the buffer width. 
The buffer width should be different for different commodities. For instance, the coffee 
buffer should be very wide since its production varies enormously from year to year. Wheat 
buffer could be set much narrower, because in the chief exporting countries, yield fluctuations 
are much less violent (Porter 1950). 
6) Modeling Assumptions 
Inspired by the ideas given above, price bands in the model, presented later in this thesis, 
were set according to the distributions of possible prices for each grain, which were generated in 
the stochastic benchmark scenario. 
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The international grain reserve is “built” outside of all countries within the model. 
Therefore, the reserve program is treated as an independent country with “imports” and 
“exports”. When grain is reserved, the volume gap between total export and total import, from all 
the countries in the model, would be “imported” to the international grain reserve. Similarly, 
when grain is released, the volume gap between total import and total export would be “exported” 
from the international grain reserve. The trade policies and transportation costs of different 
countries would also play a role in affecting reserve operation concerning world reference price 
and available global trade volume. 
In the model, the costs and revenue of the program will be observed and analyzed. 
However, they are considered of secondary importance. They will not be a constraint inserted 
into the model, but will be assessed after running scenarios with international grain reserves 
under different price bands.  
  
37 
CHAPTER 4 METHOD AND DATA 
This research used a modified version of the PEAT-Sim (Partial Equilibrium Agricultural 
Trade Simulation model) to simulate the implementation of an international grain reserve, 
involving three grain crops (rice, wheat, and corn), and test its feasibility and impact under 
different scenarios.  
4.1 Model Evaluation 
The PEAT-Sim model was developed, jointly, by the Economics Research Service (ERS) 
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural 
Sociology at Penn State University, in 2003. It was designed to analyze the effects of alternative 
proposals for agricultural trade liberalization and policy reform on a global scale (GAMS 2007). 
In 2008, M. Peters, etc., updated and modified the model with a simulation of biofuels market in 
order to analyze the biofuels expansion impact on global agricultural market. 
The model, written in the GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) programming 
language, is a partial equilibrium model. Compared with a general equilibrium model which 
could simulate the entire economy, a partial equilibrium model is based on “only a restricted 
range of data, all other markets or industries being held fixed during the analysis.” (Jain 2006-
2007) However, it is a powerful technique to explain direct relationship between factors in some 
restricted markets, especially in markets with goods or services characterized by low income 
elasticity (Perali 2003). “The stringency of the simplifying assumptions inherent in the approach 
makes the model considerably more tractable” (Holmes 1984). 
Besides, the innovative and flexible specification of the PEAT-Sim gives it the capability 
in incorporating a variety of domestic, trade policy instruments and world reference price 
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(abbreviated as PWORLD). World reference prices can be transmitted to domestic prices in 
different countries by functions with different parameters (Peters 2009).  
The model is a reduced-form model that captures the economic behavior of producers, 
consumers, and markets in a global framework, including variables that this research needs for 
production, acreage, yields, consumption, exports, imports, stocks, world prices, as well as 
domestic producer and consumer prices. It utilizes PATH solver, a Mixed Complementarity 
Problem (MCP) Algorithm, to find first order approximations to underline all these relationships 
in this global framework (Stout 2003). Constant elasticity functions, which means elasticity 
parameters are exogenous from dataset or endogenous from base year results, have been selected 
for all the countries and regions because of their easy interpretation and stable property (Peters 
2008).  
The following thirteen countries or regions have been included because they are most of 
the major exporters and importers: the United States, the European Union, Japan, Canada, 
Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, China, India, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the rest of 
the world. Thirty-two commodities are covered: ten crops (rice, wheat, corn, other coarse grains, 
soybeans oilseed, sunflowers oilseed, rapeseed oilseed, other oilseed, cotton, and sugar); six 
oilseed oil and meal products (soybean, sunflower, rapeseed); four livestock products (beef and 
veal, pork, poultry, and raw milk); six processed dairy products (fluid milk, butter, cheese, nonfat 
dry milk, whole dry milk, and other dairy products).  Among the commodities, thirteen are 
modeled as feed commodities for livestock (wheat, corn, other coarse grain, all the oilseed, and 




4.2 Model Structure 
A dynamic relationship between blocks in the model is shown in the Figure 8.  The 
model covers in an eleven-year projection. The functions for calculating variables and calibrating 
constraints in each block are almost all the same for each year of the two base years and nine 
predicted years. Endogenous parameters are calculated by data from the first two base years. The 
nine years are predicted, in turn, based on the endogenous parameters. 
The entire structure of the model is stated in the “ERS/PENN State Trade Model 
Documentation” (2004). The main structure of the model is selected and showed as follows. 
1) Production 
The model includes four types of production functions for different products: crops, 
oilseed products, livestock products, and dairy products.  
The three grain crops which I will include in the international grain reserve simulation 
involved only in crop production functions. 	%& is the production for each crop “i” in region 
“r” in year “t”, modeled as function: 
	&%  '(&% ) *+&%, for i 1 crops, 
where, '(&  is crop yield for crop “i” in region “r” in year “t”, originally modeled for 
simplicity as the constant-elasticity function: 
'(&%  5'(&% !, 	'	&%
, for i 1 crops, 
where '(&% ! is the yield of the previous year, and 	'	&% is crop’s own producer yield 
price for crop “i” that producers receive at the margin for an additional output. Normally 	'	&% 
equals to 		&%, which is producer price. 
*+&% is area harvested for commodity “i” in region “r” in year “t”, originally modeled as 
the constant-elasticity function: 
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*+&%  56*+&% !, 		7%8, for i, j 1 crops, 
where *+&% ! is area harvested in the previous year, and 		7% means own producer 
price and producer price of other complementary or competing crop for crop “i”. Table 2 
presents the matrices of price elasticities of crop area for the 3 grain crops in 13 regions in the 
model. 
2) Consumption 
The model includes five types of consumption functions for different kinds of demands: 
food/ consumer demand, feed demand, crush demand, raw milk processing demand, and other 
use demand.  
The three grain crops are involved only in the food/consumer demand functions. :&% is 
food/consumer demand for commodity “i” in region “r” in year “t”, modeled as the constant-
elasticity function: 
:&%  56	7%8, for i 1 crops, 
where 	7% means own consumer price and the consumer prices of other complementary 
or competing crop. Table 3 represents the matrices of Marshallian price elasticities used in this 
function. 
Wheat and corn as livestock feed are also involved in the feed demand activities. :&;% 
is feed demand for commodity “i” for livestock product “k” ” in region “r” in year “t, modeled as 
the constant-elasticity function: 
:&;%  56	;%, :	7%8,   
for i, j 1 commodity output, k 1 livestock product, 
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where 	;% means associated livestock production scale of “k”, and :	7% means 
own feed price and the prices of other feed products of “i”. 
E+&% is “other use demand” for commodity “i” in region “r” in year “t”, which is 
generally small and assumed to change over time by the same proportion as the changes in the 
sum of other four types of demands: 
E+&%  E+&% ! ) F GHIJK$GLIJK$MNOIJK$NHMIJK
GHIJKPQ$GLIJKPQ$MNOIJKPQ$NHMIJKPQR,  
for i1 all commodities, 
where E+&% ! is the “other use demand” for previous year, :&% is “food demand”, 
:&% is “feed demand”, T&% is “crush demand”, and 	&% is “processing demand” for 
year “t”, respectively. 
3) Import and Export 
U	&% is the candidate value for import quantity of commodity “i” in region “r” in year 
“t”, modeled as the constant-elasticity function: 
U	&%  5	U&%
, for i 1 internationally traded  commodities. 
Similarly, W	&% is the candidate value for export quantity of commodity “i” in region “r” 
in year “t”, modeled as the constant-elasticity function: 
W	&%  5	U&%
, for i 1 internationally traded  commodities. 
 In the two funcitons, 	U&% is the domestic price of commodity “i” in region “r” in 
year “t”. 




4) Domestic Stocks 
 XYZ[&%  is interpreted as the domestic ending stock of commodity “i” in region “r” in 
year “t”, modeled as the constant-elasticity function:  




for i1 all commodities, 
where 	`(& is the world reference price of commodity “i” in year “t”, and aZ[&7 
is the elasticity parameter. Since a is set to be “0”, the domestic stocks are now constant for all 
the regions in the model. That means the commercial stocks are not considered in the model. 
bcZ[&% is beginning stock for commodity “i” in region “r” in year t, and: 
bcZ[&%  XYZ[&% !, for i 1 all commodities. 
5) Domestic Market Equilibrium 
For the three grain crops, which are included in internationally traded commodities in the 
model, their net trade dE&%  is in the domestic market equilibrium for commodity “i” in region 
“r” in year “t”: 
       dE&%  W	&% " U	&% 
   	&% " :&% " :&;% " E+&%  bcZ[&% " XYZ[&%,  
for i 1 three grain crops, 
6) Global Market Equilibrium 
Global market equilibrium requires that the sum of net trade across all countries and 
regions equals zero for each internationally traded commodity: 
g dE&%
% 1 hii %jk&lm
 0,  
for i  internationally traded commodities. 
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7) Prices 
As internationally traded commodities the domestic prices for the three grain crops are 
developed endogenously, based on world reference price, transportation costs, and country 
policies that affect price. The relationships of the prices are illustrated in Figure 9 in detail. 
In the absence of additional domestic policies, domestic price 	U  for most 
region/commodity pairs is defined as a weighted average of 	op&% (price of export) and 
	qrp&% (price of import):  
	U  s	jtu 1 " s
	&wu, for 0 x s x 1
. 
	jtu and 	&wu  are also determined endogenously by the degree of subsidies, tariffs, and 
transportation costs: 
	&wu  	`( ) 1  *y  E*d*
  E*d  	, 
	jtu  	`(  W	
/1 " W*
, 
where, PWORLD represents world reference price; ADV represents ad valorem levies; 
TRANSCA represents transportation costs when expressed as a fraction of the world price; 
TRANSCS represents transportation costs when expressed on a per unit of product basis; SPEC 
represents specific levies; XSA represents any export subsidies that are given as a proportion of 
the domestic price; and XSP represents any export subsidies that are given on a per unit product 
basis. 
4.3 Data Explanation 
The base years of the original model are 2003 and 2004.  M. Peters, et. al., adapted the 
base years to 2007 and 2008. In my research, the model base years are updated to 2010/2011 and 
the projection is from 2012 to 2020.  
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Exogenous parameters in the model were drawn from the literature and from other trade 
models, including the European Simulation Model (ESIM), the Food and Agricultural Policy 
Simulator (FAPSIM), OECD’s AGLINK model, FAO’s World Food Model, the International 
Food Policy Research Institute’s IMPACT model, the Policy Analysis System-Economic 
Research Service (POLYSYS-ERS) model, and the Static World Policy Simulation Model 
(SWOPSIM). Base prices of each commodity were updated from the 2011 FAPRI-ISU World 
Agricultural Outlook. Income elasticities were updated from USDA-ERS International Food 
Consumption Patterns for 2005. Real GDP and population projection values were updated from 
International Macroeconomic Data Set for 2005 of USDA-ERS. 
Endogenous parameters were calibrated from the base years of 2010 and 2011. The base 
years’ data for commodity sets, in twelve countries, were drawn from PSD (Production, Supply 
and Distribution) of USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, including harvest area, production, 
consumption (for food, feed and crush products), beginning stocks, ending stocks, imports, and 
exports. The data for the harvest area of sugar came from the FAOSTAT Database on 
Agriculture since the data in PSD was incomplete. The base years’ data for region “ROW” (rest 
of the world) was calculated by the data of the world total deducted by the summary of the other 
twelve countries. The “ROW” data was slightly adjusted for benchmark calibrating. 
4.4 Model Modification 
To simulate the international grain reserve and analyze its feasibility, several 
modifications were made, including fluctuating the yields, plugging the international grain 
reserve into the global market, detecting aberrant prices based on price bands, adjusting the 
aberrant prices, and calculating the costs. 
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4.4.1 Stochastic Yield Simulation 
In order to simulate potential future weather situation and then estimate the potential 
price variability, this thesis used the stochastic simulation method developed by D. Ray, et. al. 
(1998). The random yield deviations were applied to the annual yield baseline in order to 
fluctuate the yields in the stochastic simulation. The yield function was modified as: 
'(&%  Zz{Y&% ) 5'(&% !, 	'	&%
, for i 1 crops, 
where Zz{Y&% is a new parameter inserted to act as the stochastic yield parameter and 
affect the yield of grain “i” in region “r” in year “t”, and is kept as “1” in the benchmark 
simulation and for commodities other than the three grain crops in the stochastic simulation. 
The parameter Zz{Y&% draws its values from a three-dimensional matrix of yield 
deviations of each grain “i” in region “r” in year “t”. The matrix was developed as the following 
steps. 
1) Historical yields, from 1960 to 2011, for each grain crop were drawn from FAOSTAT 
for EU 27 countries and from PSD of USDA for the other regions. After the data was prepared, 
historical yields for each grain crop in each region were regressed separately on the fifty-two 
year time trend.  The resulting percentage deviations from the trend can be calculated by dividing 
the difference between an observation value and the population mean by the observation value. 
For each grain crop in each region, there are fifty-two percentage deviation values.  
2) From the fifty-two percentage deviation values, a set of nine values were randomly 
selected to fluctuate the yield for that particular grain crop, in that particular region, in the nine 
years this model predicted. These percentage deviations were used to specify empirical yield 
deviation probability for the yield of upcoming years. All the sets of percentage deviations, for 
all the grain crops in all regions, are assembled and formed one forecasted global climate pattern 
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among all possible future patterns. From the same method used above, one hundred global 
climate patterns were randomly developed to do the stochastic analysis.  
3) The one hundred patterns were assembled into one correlation matrix. The values of 
the parameter stoyld|}~ were drawn from the matrix according to the grain item, region, and year. 
The general format of the matrix of yield deviations is shown in Table 5. 
4.4.2 Price Band Determination 
Before the international grain reserve was introduced, the benchmark scenario was 
operated by only running PEAT-Sim under the modification of stochastic yield simulation.  
After running the one hundred global climate patterns in the benchmark scenario, one 
hundred world price patterns were calculated. Therefore, there are one hundred possible world 
prices for each grain crop in each year. Sorting the one hundred prices from small to large, 
descriptive statistics of the prices can be easily obtained, including maximum, minimum, mean, 
median, and the quantiles. The trends of these statistic data, for the three different grains in the 
nine years, can be clearly seen in Figure 10, Figure 11, and Figure12. 
Therefore, price bands could be arranged according to the sorted results of predicted 
prices in the benchmark scenario. For example, if the objective of the reserve is to eliminate the 
five highest prices from among the one hundred possible world prices, the upper price bound 
would be set at 95%, which means 5% of the prices would be higher than the upper bound. If the 
objective is to eliminate the five lowest prices from among the one hundred possible world prices, 
the lower price bound would be set at 5%, which means 5% of the prices would be lower than 




4.4.3 International Grain Reserve in the Global Equilibrium 
To plug the international grain reserve into the global market, the equilibrium equation 
was modified as: 
g dE&%
% 1 hii %jk&lm
" &  0, 
for i 1 three grain crops. 
where & is a “free variable”, which could be either positive or negative, representing 
the net change of the international grain reserve for crop “i” in year “t”. Positive & means the 
reserve program reserves grain, moving grain from the global market to the international grain 
reserve stock. Inverse, negative & means the reserve program releases grain, moving grain 
from the international grain reserve stock to the global market. 
Therefore, the international grain reserve stock & for commodity “i” in year “t”: 
 &  & !  &, for i 1 three grain crops. 
where & ! is the international grain reserve stock for previous year. Assuming that 
the international grain reserve stock could not be negative, & is restricted as the following 
function: 
&  0, for i 1 three grain crops. 
4.4.4 The Detection and Adjustment Mechanism 
To detect the aberrant food prices which are out of the established price bands, a set of 
“loop check” functions and “reserve management” functions were inserted into the model.  
If lower prices appear, the “loop check” would distinguish the prices and the “reserve 
management” would adjust the price by reserving one unit of relative grain. Then the “loop 
check” would check the price again in the next iteration. For example, when the corn world 
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reference price was found to be lower than the corn price band, after the initial solution of one 
particular year, one unit of the corn would be pulled out from the global trade market into the 
international grain reserve, and then the model would be solved again. If after the first loop, the 
corn price was still lower than the price band, another unit of corn would be bought by the 
reserve until the price during that year was equal or slightly higher than the band.  
Similarly, the “loop check” could also distinguish prices higher than the price bands, and 
the “reserve management” could release one unit of grain to draw the prices back into the bands. 
However, one more condition must be satisfied, in the “loop check”, to ensure that the model 
continues the “reserve management” step. Not only should the prices be higher than the price 
bands, but there must be enough stock in the international reserve to allow the “reserve 
management” to release at least one unit of grain. 
The logic of the “loop check” and the “reserve management” is shown in as follows: 
- Solve the model for year t; 
- Start the “loop check”: 
Check whether  	`( x 	ilj% lm   
or whether 	`(  	uuj% lm XY &  1; 
- If the “loop check” is not satisfied, calibrate for the next year; 
- If the “loop check” is satisfied, start the “reserve management”: 
q5 	`(& x 	ilj% lm, &  &  1;  
q5 	`(&  	uuj% lm XY &  1, &  & " 1;  
- Solve the model for year t again; 
- Start the “loop check” again. 
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Here P}  represents the price at the lower price bound, P}  represents 
the price at the upper price bound, PWORLD& represents world reference price in year “t”, and 
IGR|~ represents the quantity of grain reserved or released in year “t”. IGRS|~ represents the stock 
level of the international grain reserve in year “t”, which also means the accumulated IGR of all 
the previous years. 
4.4.5 Cost of International Grain Reserve  
To estimate the total cost of an international grain reserve, the “adjustment costs” and the 
“storage costs” were calculated in the model. The “net cost” is the sum of the “storage cost” and 
the “adjustment cost”. The “total cost” of one stochastic pattern was calculated as the sum of the 
“net cost” in all the predicted period. 
The functions of cost are expressed as shown below: 






where lhi is the total cost, mj is the “net cost”,  h7wjm is the “adjustment cost”, 
l%hkj is the “storage cost”. 
 “Adjustment cost” is calculated by multiplying the world reference price by the quantity 
of grain reserved or released in that year:  
h7wjm,  	`(& ) &, 
where 	`(& is the world reference price of grain “i” at year “t”. When & is 
positive, which means the program is reserving, the h7wjm is positive, which means 
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purchasing; When & is negative, which means the program is releasing, the h7wjm is 
positive, which means selling. 
“Storage cost” is calculated by multiplying the unit of “storage cost” by the total grain in 
stock in that year:  
l%hkj,  T& ) &, 
where, T& is the unit of “storage cost” for grain “i”. The unit cost, drawn from the 
research funded under a contract from the US National Farmers Union, the grain storage 
payment unit is about $0.40 a bushel/year (Schaffer 2011). For a grain reserve, the cost is more 
related to the reserve volume rather than weight. Since the measurement in the model is by 
weight not by volume, the unit of “storage cost” is $15.75 MT/year for corn, $14.70 MT/year for 
wheat, and $19.60 MT/year for wheat after the converting. 
4.5 Scenarios 
Without activating the international grain reserve, the benchmark scenario was calibrated 
to get different price bands. Then four scenarios of the international grain reserve under different 
price bands were calibrated to test the feasibility and impact of the international grain reserves. 
• 95%-5% Scenario – the upper price bound was set to be 95%, which means 5% of 
the prices were higher than the upper price bound. The lower price bound was set 
to be 5%, which means 5% of the prices were lower than the lower price bound. 
• 95%-20% Scenario – the upper price bound was set to be 95%, which means 5% 
of the prices were higher than the upper price bound. The lower price bound was 
set to be 20%, which means 20% of the prices were lower than the lower price 
bound. 
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• 80%-20% Scenario – the upper price bound was set to be 80%, which means 20% 
of the prices were higher than the upper price bound. The lower price bound was 
set to be 20%, which means 20% of the prices were lower than the lower price 
bound. 
• 80%-40% Scenario – the upper price bound was set to be 80%, which means 20% 
of the prices were higher than the upper price bound. The lower price bound was 
set to be 40%, which means 40% of the prices were lower than the lower price 
bound. 
In each scenario of the international grain reserve, the model objective was to eliminate 
the prices which were outside of the established price bands through buying or selling grain until 




CHAPTER 5 RESULTS 
The stochastic results of each scenario solve for nine years, from 2012 through 2020. For 
each of the nine years and for each grain crop, the results contain one hundred possible values for 
world reference prices, quantities of grain reserved or released by the international grain reserve 
(IGR), quantities of grain stored in the IGR, adjustment costs, and storage costs. 
The results of each scenario are analyzed by comparing: 1) their relative effectiveness of 
adjusting market prices to within the price bands; 2) the quantity of grain needed to be adjusted; 
3) the cost of fulfilling the project goal; 4) and the impact on global market trade. Each of these 
elements will be discussed below. 
5.1 Inverse relationship between price and reserve 
Historical records indicate that price and stock have an inverse relationship which is 
reflected in the wheat price and stock from 1983 to 2010 in Figure 13 (Hui 2009). Food reserve, 
as a buffer stock program, should also have an inverse relationship with price as shown in the 
operation of a hypothetical buffer stock program in Figure 12 (Langley 1985). In this hypothesis, 
when prices are low, the reserve quantity will expand; when prices are high, the reserve quantity 
will shrink.  
The model results of my thesis demonstrate the inverse relationship between prices and 
the international grain reserve. Examples were randomly selected from one climate pattern of the 
95%-20% Scenario, as illustrated in Figure 14 for rice, Figure 15 for wheat, and Figure 16 for 
corn. When the prices are higher than the band, the IGR for that grain is positive, which means 
reserving; when prices are lower than the band, the IGR is negative, which means releasing. 
Normally, the larger the difference between the prices before the operation of the IGR and the 
IGR price bands, the greater the quantity of the reserves reserved or released. However, the 
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reserve quantity of one grain crop is not only affected by its own price, but also by other factors. 
All grain crop prices are related to each other and to other food commodities. When the reserve 
program is applied to multiple grain crops, reserve quantities of different crops are also related to 
each other. 
5.2 Effectiveness of Adjusting Prices 
Next, the reserve’s ability to stabilize price is evaluated. The model results show that the 
IGR has a certain effect on stabilizing prices, but the effectiveness of the scenarios are different 
from one another. The results of one scenario will be reviewed as an example in the following 
section, and the effectiveness comparison of all scenarios will be explained later. 
1) 95%-20% Scenario 
In the 95%-20% Scenario, the frequency of the reserving adjustment is 189 out of 900 for 
rice, 186 for wheat, and 182 for corn; the frequency of releasing adjustment is 29 for rice, 28 for 
wheat, and 20 for corn. Wheat price in this scenario will be used as an example in order to 
display the effectiveness of the reserving and releasing operations. 
Compared with the benchmark scenario, the range of all the nine hundred possible prices 
narrowed from 0.13 to 0.10 dollars per kilogram; the mean increased from 0.211 to 0.213 dollars 
per kilogram; the standard deviation decreased from 0.03 to 0.02 dollars per kilogram; the 
maximum value decreased from 0.28 to 0.27 dollars per kilogram. 
Since there is no reserve quantity constraint, all prices which are lower than the price 
band can be pulled up into the price bands by reserving. So the effectiveness on supporting 
prices is 100%. However, not all prices which are higher than price bands can be drawn back to 
the price bands. In some situations, there might not be enough grain reserve when needed. For 
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example, if prices are high in the first year (2009) no adjustment can occur because the reserve 
has had no time to accumulate. 
Since the upper price bound was set to be 95% in this scenario, five prices of the one 
hundred possible prices, in each predicted year, were initially out of the band. After the 
activation of the IGR, the numbers of prices which were drawn back to price band were 0, 0, 2, 1, 
5, 3, 4, 2, and 4 for each year of the nine years. As shown in Figure 18, the percentages of prices 
which were drawn back to band were 0%, 0%, 40%, 20%, 100%, 60%, 80%, 40%, and 80% over 
the original five prices. The numbers of prices which were still out of band were 5, 5, 3, 4, 0, 2, 1, 
3, and 1 for each year. As in other climate patterns, this example clearly shows that in the nine 
predicted years, the longer the IGR operated, the greater the possibility was that it would fulfill 
the goal. 
In summary, from the beginning, there were forty-five prices higher than the upper bound 
among the all nine hundred possible prices in the nine years. After the international grain reserve 
was activated, the total number of prices which were drawn back to the band was 21; its 
percentage was 47% over all the original forty-five prices. Before the activation of the IGR, the 
possibility of encountering an extreme high price was 5%. After the activation of the IGR, the 
possibility was reduced to 2.33%. Here, the Mean Absolut Deviation (MAD) was also used to 
show the effectiveness of the reserve. It was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the absolute 
deviations between prices above the 95% upper bounds and the prices at the 95% upper bound 
level. The MAD of all possible prices which were above the 95% upper bounds was decreased 




2) Scenario Comparisons 
The frequencies of adjustment, including the reserving and releasing of different 
scenarios, are listed in Table 6. The results show that the adjustment frequency is greater when 
the price band is narrower. 
 Details concerning the descriptive statistics of the different scenarios were compared for 
rice (Table 7), for wheat (Table 8), and for corn (Table 9). As can be observed from the 
comparison of the descriptive statistics, the range or the standard deviation of possible prices was 
smaller when the price band was narrower. This observation clearly reveals that the narrower the 
price band, the greater ability it has to stabilize prices. 
Details about extreme price elimination in the different scenarios were compared for rice 
(Table 10), for wheat (Table 11), and for corn (Table 12). As can be observed from the tables 
above, the number of extreme high prices eliminated was larger when the price band was 
narrower. The reason for that observation is that when the price band was narrower, there were 
more prices detected as prices out of band, and the reserve program had more opportunity to 
reserve or release. 
To compare the effectiveness of different scenarios under the same criterion, the extreme 
high prices were defined as prices which were above the 95% upper bound. The results show that 
generally the MAD of extreme high prices was smaller when the price band was narrower. 
However, the MAD of the 95%-20% Scenario was smaller than the 80%-20% Scenario for rice 
and corn. In the latter scenario, a certain quantity of reserve could be released to adjust prices 
which were slightly higher than the 80% upper bound. When later prices exceeded the 95% 
upper bound, there might not be enough reserve left, as in the former scenario, to draw prices 
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back to the band. If 95% upper bound became the one policy makers were interested in, setting 
the actual upper bound at 80% would not lower the MAD of extreme high prices. 
5.3 Quantity of Grain Reserved or Released 
In the model, the maximum capacity of the IGR was not set as a constraint. The results of 
the quantity of grain reserved and released were presented as following for further discussion. 
1) 95%-20% Scenario 
In the 95%-20% Scenario, the maximum quantity of annual IGR purchases, among the 
nine hundred possible quantities, was 32 million metric tons for rice, 49 million metric tons for 
wheat, and 52 million metric tons for corn. The reserved grains account for 6%, 6%, and 5% of 
the world production in those respective years. The maximum quantity of grain sells from the 
IGR was 6 million metric tons for rice, 22 million metric tons for wheat, and 32 million metric 
tons for corn. The released grains were as much as 1%, 3%, and 4% of the world production in 
those respective years. The median quantity and the mode quantity of annual IGR adjustment 
was 0 metric ton for all the grains. The average quantity was 1.69 million metric tons for rice, 
1.68 million metric tons for wheat, and 1.83 million metric tons for corn, which was consistent 
with the assumption that more grains were reserved into the IGR than released. 
In some cases, reserves might keep increasing without releasing. The accumulated 
quantity in IGR was calculated as the international grain reserve stocks (IGRS). In this scenario, 
the maximum quantity of annual IGRS, among the nine hundred possible annual IGRS, was 71 
million metric tons for rice, 80 million metric tons for wheat, and 114 million metric tons for 
corn. They made up for 14.53%, 10.16%, 10.08% of the annual production in the respective 
years; and 1%, 1%, and 1% of the total production in the nine years from that corresponding 
climate pattern. The average quantity of annual IGRS was 8.43 million metric tons for rice, 9.10 
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million metric tons for wheat, and 9.80 million metric tons. The average quantities of annual 
IGRS for each predicted year, 2012-2020, were 2.86, 5.08, 7.08, 9.05, 11.68, 14.34, 15.53, 16.02, 
and 18.44 million metric tons. As also shown in the results from all other scenarios, the average 
quantity of annual IGRS for each predicted year increased over time, during the years 2012-2020.  
2) Scenario Comparisons 
The quantity statistics of all of the scenarios were presented and compared for annual 
IGR adjustment (Table 13) and for annual IGRS (Table 14).  
Generally, when the lower price bound was lowered, the maximum quantity of annual 
IGR reserved was larger; the maximum quantity of annual IGR released was larger (which 
means the minimum quantity of IGR reserved was smaller); the maximum quantity of annual 
IGRS was also larger. In the 95%-20% Scenario and the 80%-20% scenario, their lower bounds 
were the same. The maximum amount the IGR released, for the latter scenario, was larger since 
the IGR had lower upper price bound; the maximum amount of IGRS of the former scenario was 
larger since it had less opportunity to release. 
The average quantities of annual IGRS for each predicted year were compared by 
different scenarios in Figure 19. For scenarios with the same lower bound, the one with higher 
upper bound had a higher IGRS increasing rate. For scenarios with the same upper bound, the 
one with lower bound had a higher IGRS increasing rate. 
5.4 Cost of the International Grain Reserve 
The IGR cost was neither set as a constraint in the model. The results of IGR costs 




1) 95%-20% Scenario 
Wheat, in the 95%-20% Scenario, will be reviewed as an example. The maximum 
adjustment cost of annual IGR among the nine hundred possible costs was 9.64 billion dollars. 
The minimum adjustment cost of annual IGR adjustment was -5.61billion dollars, which means 
the maximum revenue of releasing grain from the IGR was 5.61 billion dollars. The average 
adjustment cost was 0.37 billion dollars. The maximum storage cost of annual IGRS among the 
nine hundred possible costs was 1.18 billion dollars. The median storage cost was 0 billion 
dollars and the average storage cost was 0.16 billion dollars.  
The maximum total net cost (the sum of total adjustment cost and total storage cost in 
nine years) was 18.22 billion dollars and the minimum net cost was -0.62 billion dollars. The 
median net cost was 4.30 billion dollars and the average net cost of the nine possible costs was 
4.78 billion dollars. The maximum total cost for all grain crops for the nine year period was 
53.05 billion dollars and the minimum total cost was 23.09 billion dollars. The median total cost 
was 17.96 billion dollars and the average total cost was 18.30 billion dollars for wheat.  
The Common Agricultural Policy of E.U. costs about 55 billion euros per year, about 
67.54 billion dollars according to the budget for six years, 2007-2013. This represents 40% of the 
total EU budget, and less than 0.5% of the total E.U. GDP (ECDGARD 2007). In the U.S, the 
farmers’ subsidies for rice, wheat, and corn were about 5.67 and 7.02 billion dollars for 2010 and 
2011 (EWG 2011). Compared with these programs costs, the IGR is relatively cheap as a global 
food program. 
2) Scenario Comparisons 
The annual cost and the total cost of different scenarios were compared for rice (Table 
15), for wheat (Table 16 ), and for corn (Table 17 ). The annual net cost was calculated by the 
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sum of adjustment cost and storage cost that year. The total annual net cost was calculated by the 
sum of the annual net costs in nine year period. Total adjustment costs and total storage costs 
were calculated respectively by the sum of adjustment costs and sum of storage costs in nine year 
period. The total costs of the different scenarios, which were calculated by the sum of total net 
costs for all the three grain crops, were compared in Table 18. In Figure 20, the average values of 
total net cost of different scenarios were compared. 
As shown in the tables and figures above, generally when the price band was narrower, 
the cost was greater. However compared with the 80%-20% Scenario, the 95%-20% Scenario is 
more costly. Its adjustment cost and storage cost were greater because it had less opportunity to 
release reserves.  
The average value of the annual net cost, by time trend, was illustrated for rice (Figure 
21), for wheat (Figure 22), and for corn (Figure 23). In the 95%-20% Scenario with unparalleled 
price band ( compared with 80%-20% Scenario, this price band has relatively higher upper 
bound), the slope of trend lines appears to be slightly larger, meaning that the longer the IGR 
operates, the more costly it would be. But for scenarios with paralleled price bands (such as 
95%-5% and 80%-20% Scenarios), the trend lines appeared to be flat or slightly declining, 
suggesting that cost would not increase over time. 
5.5 Impact on Global Food Market 
To analyze the impact of the reserve program on the global agricultural market, the 
example of wheat from the 95%-20% Scenario was selected and illustrated in Figure 24.  
In that example, the 20% lower price bound in 2014 was 0.18 dollars per kilogram, and 
the price in the benchmark scenario was 0.17 dollars per kilogram. When the IGR was activated, 
the IGR reserved 15 million metric tons of wheat in 2014 and pulled the price up to 0.18 dollars 
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per kilogram. Compared with benchmark scenario, world total production increased by 9.17 
million metric tons in that year; world total harvest area increased 1.52 million acres; world total 
food consumption decreased by 3.19 million metric tons; world total export increased 8.41 
million metric tons; and world total import decreased 6.95 million metric tons. In 2017, the 95% 
upper price bound was 0.25 dollars per kilogram and the price before the activation of IGR was 
0.27 dollars per kilogram. The IGR released all the 15 million metric tons of wheat in the storage, 
and the price was drawn lower to 0.26 dollars per kilogram. The world total food production 
decreased 9.07 million metric tons; world total harvest area decreased 1.82 million acres; world 
total food consumption increased 3.22 million metric tons; world total export decreased 7.50 
million metric tons; and world total import increased 7.50 million metric tons. 
Evidences show that when the IGR reserves more, world total production is stimulated to 
produce more but world total food consumption became less. Production increased when reserve 
purchased because farmers responded to the higher price by increasing the harvest area. 
Consumption decreased because consumers responded to the higher price by decreasing the 
purchasing. Likewise, production increased when reserve released because farmers responded to 
the lower price by decreasing the harvest area. The IGR operation also affected world total 
import and export quantity, the reserve quantity was equal to the world total trade gap. Export 
would increase and import will decrease when grain reserves were purchased; export would 
decrease and import would increase when grain reserves were sold. 
In the 95%-20% Scenario example, the average quantity of world total production in the 
nine years, from the one hundred patterns, increased 20.73 million metric tons for rice, 26.13 
million metric tons for wheat, and 51.72 for corn. The average quantity of world total food 
consumption in the nine years, from the one hundred patterns, increased 2.13 million metric tons 
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for rice, 6.53 million metric tons for wheat, and 6.75 for corn. Therefore, the IGR activation 
encouraged the world total food consumption and stimulated world total production.  
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION 
According to the model results, we see that the international grain reserve demonstrated a 
reverse relationship with world reference price, a strong effectiveness to support price above an 
established lower bound, a certain effectiveness to eliminate extreme high prices in some 
scenarios with certain price bands, and a relatively feasible cost to operate in some scenarios.  
Several regular patterns were found. First, the international grain reserve had more 
possibility to eliminate extreme high prices when it operated longer. Second, the potential 
quantity of accumulated IGRS for each predicted year increased over time. Third, the annual cost 
of scenarios with paralleled price bands tended to have a flat or slightly decreasing trend; while 
the possible annual cost of the unparalleled price band scenarios with relatively higher upper 
price bound tended to have an increasing trend.  
The results also showed the fact that the IGR has an effect to disturb the free market. It 
affects farmers’ consideration to respond the adjusted price and the more secured environment. 
For example, farmers are stimulated by the higher price to produce more when the IGR reserves. 
In summary for nine predicted years, the IGR stimulates more world total production and 
encourages more world total food consumption. Further study should be done to compare the 
positive and negative influences of the IGR. 
6.1 Choosing an Optimal Price Band 
To select the appropriate price bands, all of the effects upon prices, reserve quantities, 
and costs should be considered. According to the model results, when the price band was 
narrower, the adjustment frequency was greater, the range or the standard deviation of all the 
possible prices was the smaller, and the possible quantity of grain reserved or released was larger. 
When two scenarios had the same upper price bound, the one with higher lower price bound had 
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the smaller MAD of the extreme high prices and was more costly. When two scenarios had the 
same lower price bound, the one with higher upper price bound had the smaller MAD of the 
extreme high prices and was more costly. 
If the objective priority of the IGR program is to protect consumers’ welfare, price band 
with 95% upper bound and 20% lower bound is more appropriate. Compared with other 
scenarios, this price band makes it more possible to reduce extreme high prices occasions and 
extreme food shortages. Even though in some cases the extreme high prices cannot be drawn 
back to price band, they are mitigated significantly by the price adjustment. However, the cost of 
this price band program will be relatively high and will increase slightly over time. 
If the objective priority of the IGR program is to support producers’ income, price band 
with 80% upper bound and 20% lower bound is more appropriate. Compared with other 
scenarios, this price band makes the program intervene more frequently, thereby, supporting 
producers’ income and avoiding the over accumulation of IGRS. The price band makes the 
reserve program more sustainable because its cost will be relatively low and stable over time. 
However, its ability to mitigate extreme high prices is not as well as price band with 05% upper 
bound and 20% lower bound. 
6.2 Further Discussion 
In further study of the IGR, reserve quantity limitation can be introduced as a constraint 
in the model. Since the model results show the average annual IGRS for each predicted year is 
increasing during the modeled time period, it’s necessary to set up a top limit, with respect to the 
storage capacity reality. The top limit can be defined as a maximum reserve capability that limits 
the IGRS; it can also be as a maximum percentage of the annual reserve quantity over the 
production that year that limits the annual IGR.  
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Cost should also be introduced as a constraint in the model in the future. Cost of 
unparalleled price bands may increase in time so the maximum annual net cost should to be 
defined. The adjustment and storage costs do not cover all the costs of operating an international 
grain reserves. Marketing, transportation, and operation costs of each reserving or releasing 
activity should also be included in further study. Comparing scenarios with the same lower price 
bound, even though the cost results of the scenario with higher upper price bound was greater, 
the actual cost may not be greater when all the other kinds of costs are considered. Because it has 
less opportunity to release reserves, the management cost of the releasing activity, may be 
significantly less.   
The effectiveness of the IGR generally increased during the nine years, for all the crops. 
But the modeled time period was not long enough to show more about the trend. The long-term 
trend of effectiveness may increase over the first several years and then become more flat. 
Longer operation years should be simulated to demonstrate more about the reserve quantity trend 
and cost trend.  
The IGR impact on the global food market was not very accurate since the model was an 
annual simulation model. It assumed that farmers not only made decisions based on the lagged 
yields and lagged harvest area, but also made  decisions, immediately, based on the price during 
that year. To be more realistic, the model needs to become a seasonal simulation, with farmers 
responding to the prices in the following season. 
Since commercial stocks are not considered in this model, yield deviations put all the 
pressure on the demand and supply equilibrium to take make full adjustments. After activating 
the IGR, all the results concerning the program were slightly exaggerated, meaning the IGR 
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replaced part of the impact of commercial stocks. With adequate simulation of commercial 




CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
An international food reserve (IGR) can be a valid policy instrument with multi-
functionality, including: 1) mitigating severe food shortages and protecting the “right to food”; 2) 
reducing the probability of excess price surges caused by hoarding, speculation and climate 
change in order to protect the interests of consumers and downstream industries; 3) supporting 
prices, and therefore supporting farmers’ income, reducing poverty, and improving the 
performance of the local food supply system; 4) enhancing a healthy supply response and 
investment in agriculture by stabilizing prices, and preventing the collapse of confidence in the 
international grain market; and 5) encouraging cooperating nations to meet the worldwide and 
local emergencies jointly. 
According to the model results, we see that an international grain reserve can demonstrate 
a reverse relationship with world reference price, a strong effectiveness to support price above an 
established lower bound, a certain effectiveness to eliminate extreme high prices in some 
scenarios, and a relatively feasible cost to operate in some scenarios.  As the international grain 
reserve operates longer, its ability of eliminating extreme high prices is greater and the potential 
quantity of accumulated reserve stock is larger. The international grain reserve program with 
paralleled price band tends to have a stable or slightly decreasing cost over time; while 
unparalleled price band with relatively higher upper price bound leads to an increasing cost. The 
activation of the reserve program stimulates more world total production and encourages more 
world total food consumption. 
In order to evaluate the feasibility of a particular price band, the primary objective for 
initiating a reserve should be considered. If the primary objective is to protect consumer’s 
welfare, the model results suggested that the upper price bound should not be set too low to 
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invalidate the programs ability to avoid extreme high prices; if the primary objective is to 
support producer’s income, the model results indicate that a price band with a relatively low 
upper price bound would help to make the reserve program sustainable. 
Further study should be done to compare the positive and negative influences of the 
















Abbott, P.C., C. Hurt, T. Wallace, 2011. "What’s Driving Food Prices in 2011?" Issue Report of 
Farm Foundation.  
Ainsworth, E.A., A. Rogers, R. Nelson and S.P. Long. 2004. "Testing the source–sink hypothesis 
of down-regulation of photosynthesis in elevated CO2 in the field with single gene substitutions 
in Glycine max. " Agricultural and Forest Meteorology. 122: 85-94. 
Asian Development Band. 2008. Soaring Food Prices: Response to the Crisis. Manila 
Behrman, J.R. 1981. "Macro Models for Developing Countries." Journal of Development 
Economics. 8(1):134-141. 
Bodde, D. 1948. "Chinese idea in the west." In China: A Teaching Workbook. New York: 
Columbia University.  
Bradsher, K. 2008. "A Drought in Australia, a Global Shortage of Rice." The food Chain- A 
Series from New York Times, April. 
Braun, J.V. 2009. "Food-Security Risks Must Be Comprehensively Addressed" In 2008-2009 
Annual Report. International Food Policy Research Institution, pp:12. 
Braun, J.V., J. Lin, and M. Torero. 2009. "Eliminating Drastic Food Price Spikes." Discussion 
Paper. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington D.C. 
Braun, J.V., and M. Torero. 2009. "Implementing Physical and Virtual Food Reserves to Protect 
the Poor and Prevent Market Failure." Policy Brief. International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington D.C.   
Brian Wright. 2009. "International grain reserves and other instruments to address volatility in 
grain markets." Working Paper, presented at the World Grain Forum, Russia. 
70 
Brown, L., 2011. "The Great Food Crisis of 2011." Foreign Policy, Jan.   
Chiotti, Q.P., T. Johnston. 1995. “Extending the boundaries of climate change research: a 
discussion on agriculture.” J. Rural Stud. 11: 335–350. 
Demeke, M, G. Pangrazio, and M. Maetz. 2008. "Country responses to the food security crisis: 
Nature and preliminary implications of the policies pursued." Unpublished, The Agricultural 
Policy Support Service and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
Easterling, W. E., P. K. Aggarwal, P. Batima, K.M. Brander,  L. Erda, S. M. Howden,  A. 
Kirilenko, J. Morton, J.F. Soussana, J. Schmidhuber, and F. N. Tubiello. 2007. "Food, fibre and 
forest products." In Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution 
of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, Parry, M. L., O. F. Canziani, J. P. Palutikof, P. J. van der Linden, and C. E. 
Hanson, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Edsforth, R. 2000. The New Deal: America's response to the Great Depression. Malden: 
Blackwell Publisher Inc. 
European Commission Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, 2007. “The 
Common Agricultural Policy Explained”. Brussels. 
Evenson, R.E. 1999. "Global and local implications of biotechnology and climate change for 
future food supplies." Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 96:5921–5928. 
EWG Farm Subsidies, 2011. “The United States Summary Information”. D.C. 
71 
Fischer, G., H. van Velthuizen, M. Shah and F.O. Nachtergaele. 2002. "Global agro-ecological 
assessment for agriculture in the 21st century: methodology and results". Research Report. 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria. 
Fischer, G., M. Shah. 2005. "Socio-economic and climate change impacts on agriculture: an 
integrated assessment, 1990-2080." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences. 360(1463): 2067-2083. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 1998. "The review of the 1996 
farm legislation in the United States." In Cereal policies review, 1995-97. Rome.  
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 1998. "Food Security in South 
East Asia." In Poverty Alleviation and Food Security in Asia-Lessons and Challenges, Rome 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2008a. "Soaring Food Prices: 
Facts, Perspectives, Impacts and Actions Required." Document presented at High Level 
Conference on World Food Security: The Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy, Rome, 
3–5 June. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2008b. Global Cereal supply 
and demand brief. Rome.  
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2009a.  The State of 
Agricultural Commodity Markets 2009. Rome. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2009b. World Summit on Food 
Security. Rome. 
72 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2011a. Global food price 
monitor in February 2011. Rome.  
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2011b. Global food price 
monitor in March 2011. Rome.  
The World Band. 2010. Food Price Watch Dec 2010.   
GAMS. 2007. "Optimization. Fact sheet, GMAS Development Corporation. Washington D.C. 
Galtier, F., 2009. " How to manage food price instability in developing countries?" Working 
Paper of Moisa, Montpellier. 
Galtier, F., 2011. "Adapting the response to the market-perspective."  Perspective, N10.  
Gardner, B. 1981. Farmer-Owned Grain Reserve Program Needs Modification To Improve 
Effectiveness: Consequences Of USDA's Farmer-Owned Reserve Program For Grain Stocks And 
Prices. The General Accounting Office, Prepared for Report To the Congress, June. 
Gifford, R.M. 2004. "The CO2 fertilising effect – does it occur in the real world?" New Phytol. 
163: 221-225.  
Gilbert, C., 2010. "How to Understand High Food Prices." Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
61: 398-425. 
Gregory, P. J., J. S. I. Ingram, and M. Brklacich. 2005. "Climate Change and Food Security." 
Food Crops in a Changing Climate . 11: 2139-2148. 
Groisman, P.Y. R.W. Knight, D.R. Easterling, T.R. Karl, G.C. Hegerl, V.N. Razuvaev. 2005. 
"Trends in intense precipitation in the climate record". Journal of Climate. 18: 1326–1350.  
Harkness, J. 2011. "China's Wise Wheat Reserves." The Asheville (NC) Citizen-Times, Mar.  
73 
Hart, C., and B.A. Babcock. 2000. "Time for a New Farmer-Owned Reserve?" Working paper, 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD), Tarzana, Aug. 
Hayek, F.A., 1945.  "The Use of Knowledge in Society." American Economic Review, 4: 519-
530. 
Headey, D., S. Malaiyandi, S. Fan. 2009. "Navigating the Perfect Storm: Reflections on the Food, 
Energy, and Financial Crises." Discussion Paper, International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Aug. 
Hearne, R.R. 1996. "A Review of Economic Appraisal of Environmental Goods and Services: 
With a Focus on Developing Countries." Discussion Paper, International Institute for 
Environment and Development, Environmental Economics Programme.  
Hernandez, M.A., M. Robles, and M. Torero. 2010. "Fires in Russia, Wheat Production, and 
Volatile MarketsReasons to Panic?" Unpublished, International Food Policy Research Institution.   
Hui, J. 2009. Grain Reserves: Solution to Food Insecurity and Market/Price Instability? 
Washington DC: Office of Global Analysis of Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA, October. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: 
Climate Change 2007 (AR4). Geneva. 
IMF External Relations Department. 2002. Malawi- The Food Crises, the Strategic Grain 
Reserve, and the IMF. The Factsheet, July. 
Institute For Agriculture and Trade Policy. 2010. Food reserves needed to respond to global food 
crisis, civil society groups say. Dublin. 
74 
Integrated Regional Information Networks . 2011. "NIGER: New approaches needed in tackling 
malnutrition." reported on IRIN News, April.  
Issacharoff, L. 2009. "Global Food Crisis: Rising Prices and Protectionism" American Foreign 
Policy - Princeton Student Editorials on Global Politics, Dec.  
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007. "Changes in Extreme Events". In Working 
Group I: The Physical Science Basis. Switzerland. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007. "How is the precipitation changing". In 
Working Group I: The Physical Science Basis. Switzerland. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007. "Executive summary". In Working Group II: 
Impacts, Adaption and Vulnerability of The Fourth Assessment. Switzerland.  
Janvry, A.Dd., and E. Sadoulet. 1982. "Agricultural price policy in general equilibrium models: 
results and comparisons." American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69(2): 23. 
Karim, I.E.E.A., and D. Abler. 2008. "Implications of a Doha Agreement on Agricultural 
Markets in Sudan." Working paper, Dept. of Agricultural Economics, University of Khartoum, 
Sudan. 
Knutson, R.D. , J. B. Penn, B.L. Flinchbaugh. 1998. "Agricultural and Food Policy(Fourth 
Edition)." Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.  
Langley, J.A., R.D. Reinsel, J.A. Craven, J.A. Zellner, and F.J. Nelson. 1985. "Commodity Price 
and Income Support Policies." In Agricultural-Food Policy Review: Commodity Program 
Perspectives. Agricultural Economic Report, July.  
75 
Lind, K.M. 2001. "Food reserve stocks and critical food shortages – a proposal based on the 
needs of Sub-Saharan Africa." Working Paper, Danish Institute of Agricultural and Fisheries 
Economics1 Agricultural Policy Research Division. 
Liu, M. 2009. "China's grain reserve is above the food security cordon." China Internet 
Information Center, May.  
Liu, Y. 2003. "Analysis of China's Grain Reserve." Grain Issues Research F3. 
Long, S.P., E.A. Ainsworth, A. Rogers and D.R. Ort. 2004. "Rising atmospheric carbon dioxide: 
plants face the future." Annual Review of Plant Physiology. 55: 591-628. 
Mayer, C. 2010. "Russia's Wheat Problem Could Be Just The Beginning Of A Global Food 
Crisis." The Daily Reckoning, Aug.   
Mazhirov, A. 2011. "Climate Change to Exacerbate Rising Food Prices." State of the Planet. The 
Earth Institute, Colombia University.  
Meyers, W.H., and M.E. Ryan. 1981. "American Journal of Agricultural Economics: The 
Farmer-Owned Reserve: How Is the Experiment Working?" American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. Oxford University Press, pp: 319.  
Meyers, W.H. 1988. The Farmer-owned reserve after eight years: A summary of research 
findings and implications. Ames, IA: Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, 
Iowa State University of Science and Technology.  
Murphy, S. 2009. "Trade and Food Reserves-What role does the WTO play?" Working paper, 
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Sep. 
76 
Nelson, G.C., M.W. Rosegrant, A. Palazzo, I. Gray, C. Ingersoll, R. Robertson, S. Tokgoz, T. 
Zhu, T.B. Sulser, C. Ringler, S. Msangi, and L. You. 2010. "Food Security, Farming, and 
Climate Change to 2050: Scenarios, Results, Policy Options." Washington DC: International 
Food Policy Research Institute. 
Nelson, G. C., M. W. Rosegrant, J. Koo, R. Robertson, T. Sulser, T. Zhu, C. Ringler, S. Msangi, 
A. Palazzo, M. Batka, M. Magalhaes, R. Valmonte-Santos, M. Ewing, and D. Lee. 2009. Climate 
Change: Impact on Agriculture and Costs of Adaptation. Food Policy Report. Washington, D.C.: 
International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Ng, F., and M.A. Askoy. 2008. "Who are the net food importing countries ?" Paper included in 
The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series. New York, Jan. 
National Development and Reform Committee of China. 2010. "China uses 8.5m tons of grain 
reserve to ensure market supply." The Xinhua News. Beijing, Nov.   
National Development and Reform Committee of China. 2011. "Grain reserve hits 40% of 
annual consumption." The Xinhua News. Beijing, Mar. 
Newbery, D.G., and J.E. Stiglitz, 1984. "Pareto Inferior Trade." Concluded in Review of 
Economic Studies, L1:1-2. 
O’Keefe, J, C. Callieri, D. Mahler, J Hauff,  A. Aulisi,  A. Cassara, C. Davis, R. Nogueron, and J. 
Rodgers, A. Sauer. 2008. RATTLING SUPPLY CHAINS: The Effect of Environmental Trends on 
Input Costs for the Fast-Moving Consumer Goods Industry. Chicago: A.T. Kearney Inc. 
Peters, M., A. Somwaru, R. Stillman, J. Hansen, D. Kelch and R. Seeley. 2008.  "Modeling 
Biofuels: Global Production and Trade Implications." Presented at the IATRC Annual General 
Meeting, Scottsdale. 
77 
Peters, M., A. Somwaru, J.M. Hansen, R. Seeley, S. Dirkse. 2009. "Modeling Biofuels 
Expansion in a Changing Global Environment." Contributed Paper at International Association 
of Agricultural Economists 2009 Conference. Beijing, 16-22 August.      
Peters, M., R. Stillman, and A. Somwaru. 2010. "Biofuels Expansion in a Changing Economic 
Environment: A Global Modeling Perspective." In V.E. Ball, R. Fanfani, and L. Gutierrez, ed. 
The Economic Impact of Public Support to Agriculture - An International Perspective. New 
York: Springer Science+Business Media, pp 149. 
Pinckney, T.C. 1988. "Operational Management Rules for Stabilizing a Grain Price." In IFPRI 
Research Report. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.  
Porter, R. S. 1950. "Buffer Stocks and Economic Stability." Oxford Economic Papers, New 
Series, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan., 1950), Oxford University Press, pp. 95-118. 
Pradhan, S. 1988. "Market failures and government failures: Industrial restructuring and pricing 
policy analysis for the Indian fertilizer sector". In: PhD dissertation, Economics Department and 
Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA (1988), pp. 31–32.  
Riefler, W.W. 1946. "A Proposal for an International Buffer Stock Agency." Journal of Political 
Economy, December, pp. 543.  
Rahman, S.H., 1984. "Analysis of a Flexible Market Stabilization Policy in the Jute Sector and 
its Sensitivity to a Parametric Change in Demand." The Bangladesh Development Studies, 12(3): 
64-73. 
Ramalingam, B., K. Proudlock, and J. Mitchell. 2008. "The Global Food Price Crisis: Lessons 
and Ideas for Relief Planners and Managers." Lessons paper, Active Learning Network for 
Accountability and Performance, London. 
78 
Rawski, T.G., and L.M. Li. 1992. Chinese History in Economic Perspective. Los Angeles: 
University of California Press.  
Ray, D.E., G.W. Richardson, D.G. De La Terre Ugarte, and K.H. Tiller, 1998. “Estimating Price 
Variability in Agriculture: Implications for Decision Makers”. Journal of Agricultural and 
Applied Economics, 30(1):21–33. 
Ray, D.E. 2009. "Brief history of farm programs." Unpublished, Agricultural Policy Analysis 
Center. 
Ray, D.E. 2009. "Historical Overview of U.S. Agricultural Policies and Programs." Unpublished, 
Agricultural Policy Analysis Center. 
Ray, D.E. 2004. "Agricultural Policy for the Twenty-First Century and the Legacy of the 
Wallaces." Presented at John Pesek Colloquium of Sustainable Agriculture, Iowa State 
University, Ames.  
Rosen, S., S, Shapouri, 2008. "Rising Food Prices Intensify Food Insecurity in Developing 
Countries." Feature, 6:1.  
Rosenzweig, C., and M.L. Parry. 1994. "Potential impact of climate change on world food 
supply." Nature. 367: 133 - 138. 
Rosegrant, M.W., and S.A. Cline. 2003. "Global Food Security: Challenges and Policies." 
SCIENCE. 302: 5652; 1917-1919. 
Sampson, K. 2010. "Stabilizing Agriculture Markets: Food Reserves in Practice." Working paper, 
Institute For Agriculture and Trade Policy, Minneapolis, Oct. 
79 
Sarris, A. 1985. "Safe Levels of Global Grain Carryover Stocks for World Food Security." The 
report prepared for FAO Commodities Division, September. 
Sivakumar, M.V. K., H. P. Das, and O. Brunini. 2005. "Impacts of Present and Future Climate 
Variability and Change on Agriculture and Forestry in the Arid and Semi-Arid Tropics." 
Climatic Change .70: 31-72 
Shaw, D.J. 2007. World food security: a history since 1945. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Stout, J., and D. Abler. 2003. "ERS/PENN State Trade Model Documentation." Model 
documentation of PEATSim. Washington DC, August. 
Terrascope of MIT. 2010. "Regional Food Reserves." In Solutions of Mission 2014: Feeding the 
World. Cambridge.  
Tebaldi, C., and D.B. Lobell. 2008. "Towards probabilistic projections of climate change impacts 
on global crop yields." Geophysical Research Letters 35: 6. 
Thomson, P.  2011. "High food prices in Egypt and climate change" The World, Feb. 
Timmer, C.P. 1989. "Food price policy - the rationale for government intervention". Food Policy 
14:17-27. 
Toepfer. 2007. "Biofuels to Keep Global Grain Prices High." Reuters News, July.   
Tongeren, F., H. Meij, and Y. Surry. 2001. "Global models applied to agricultural and trade 
policies: a review and assessment." Agricultural Economics. 26:149-172. 
De La Torre Ugarte, D., 2009. "Agricultural Investment and Virtual Global Food Reserves" 
Unpulished. Agriculture Policy Analysis Center, University of Tennessee. 
80 
Ulimwengu, J, S. Workneh, and Z. Paulos. 2009. "Impact of Soaring Food Price in Ethiopia - 
Does Location Matter?" International Food Policy Research Institute, Feb. 
Ulrich, K. 1986. "Regional Cooperation to Improve Food Security in Southern And Eastern 
African Countries." Research Report, International Food Polity Research Institute, July. 
UPI News. 2011 "Spokesman: China has enough grain reserves." United Press International, 
Feb.  
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). July 2011.  
Humanitarian Requirements for the Horn of Africa Drought. New York.  
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1999. Fact Sheet: Commodity Credit Corporation. Washington 
DC, November.  
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 2006. Fact Sheet: Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust. 
Washington DC, March. 
Vokes. R., and S. Jayakody. 2010. "Managing the Food Price Crisis in South Asia." In S. Ahmed, 
ed. Promoting Economic Cooperation in South Asia. India: SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd, pp. 
210. 
Wang, J. 2002. "Analysis of Ancient Food Reserve System." People's Daily(PRC), July. 
Willoughby, R., and A. Parsons. 2009. "Global food reserves Framing the context for a  
new multilateralism." Share The World’s Resources, Oct. 
Wolfram Schlenker, and Michael J. Roberts. 2008. “Estimating the impact of climate change on 
crop yields: The importance of non-linear temperature effects.” NBER Working Paper. U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Economic Research Service (ERS), February. 
81 
Young, C. E., P.C. Westcott, L.A. Hoffman, W.W. Lin, and S.L. Rosen. 1999. "An Economic 
Analysis Of A Food Security Commodity Reserve: Commodity Vs. Cash." Paper presented at 
















Table 1. Percentage Price Rises, 2006-2008  
 
 Peak month 2000 average to  
peak month 
January 2006 to  
July 2008 
Food Commodities    
Maize June 2008 225 160 
Rice March 2008 339 172 
Soybeans April 2008 398 181 
Sugar July 2008 203 151 
IMF Indices    
Agricultural foods June 2008 119 76 
Agricultural raw materials July 2008 24 20 
Note: Prices are in nominal US dollars. All values are in percentage. 




Table 2. Crop Area Elasticity Matrices 
 
     
USA(usa) rice.usa wheat.usa corn.usa soybean.usa 
rice 0.26120 -0.02113 -0.05796 -0.13041 
wheat -0.00121 0.17984 -0.04755 -0.05795 
corn -0.00242 -0.03467 0.28806 -0.20282 
soybean -0.00545 -0.04226 -0.20286 0.33948 
EU27(eu) rice.eu wheat.eu corn.eu soybean.eu 
rice 0.21265 -0.03098 -0.01478 -0.00071 
wheat -0.00068 0.44722 -0.02660 -0.00119 
corn -0.00137 -0.11153 0.23533 -0.00357 
soybean -0.00082 -0.06196 -0.04433 0.19608 
Japan(jpn) rice.jpn wheat.jpn corn.jpn soybean.jpn 
rice 0.23843 -0.00774 -0.00008 -0.01041 
wheat -0.07487 0.34450 -0.00008 -0.01041 
corn -0.14975 -0.01548 0.22648 -0.05203 
soybean -0.14975 -0.01548 -0.00042 0.39729 
Canada(can) rice.can wheat.can corn.can soybean.can 
rice     
wheat  0.27220 -0.00867 -0.00836 
corn  -0.08643 0.23380 -0.04180 
soybean  -0.08643 -0.04333 0.25954 
Mexico(mex) rice.mex wheat.mex corn.mex soybean.mex 
rice 0.21824 -0.00528 -0.11670 -0.00120 
wheat -0.00068 0.26124 -0.11670 -0.00120 
corn -0.00135 -0.01057 0.11211 -0.00598 
soybean -0.00135 -0.01057 -0.58348 0.72338 
Brail(brz) rice.brz wheat.brz corn.brz soybean.brz 
rice 0.21656 -0.00356 -0.06907 -0.06833 
wheat -0.00823 0.26215 -0.06907 -0.06833 
corn -0.01647 -0.00712 0.44064 -0.34163 
soybean -0.01647 -0.00712 -0.34533 0.46338 
85 
Argentina(arg) rice.arg wheat.arg corn.arg soybean.arg 
rice 0.27129 -0.02256 -0.01976 -0.07058 
wheat -0.00044 0.29592 -0.01976 -0.07058 
corn -0.00089 -0.04512 0.55982 -0.35292 
soybean -0.00089 -0.04512 -0.09882 0.31341 
China(chn) rice.chn wheat.chn corn.chn soybean.chn 
rice 0.12504 -0.02258 -0.04013 -0.01555 
wheat -0.02508 0.16271 -0.04013 -0.01555 
corn -0.05017 -0.04515 0.21943 -0.07776 
soybean -0.05017 -0.04515 -0.20067 0.35142 
Australia(aus) rice.aus wheat.aus corn.aus soybean.aus 
rice 0.15431 -0.05856 -0.00068 -0.00048 
wheat -0.00090 0.20685 -0.00068 -0.00048 
corn -0.00180 -0.11713 0.21913 -0.00242 
soybean -0.00180 -0.11713 -0.00339 0.25290 
New Zealand(nzl) rice.nzl wheat.nzl corn.nzl soybean.nzl 
rice     
wheat  0.33756 -0.01657  
corn  -0.06077 0.21658  
soybean     
South Korean(kor) rice.kor wheat.kor corn.kor soybean.kor 
rice 0.09253 -0.00007 -0.00278 -0.01195 
wheat -0.07450 0.19166 -0.00278 -0.01195 
corn -0.14899 -0.00014 0.28617 -0.05976 
soybean -0.14899 -0.00014 -0.01390 0.24767 
Rest of the 
World(row) 
rice.row wheat.row corn.row soybean.row 
rice 0.16153 -0.02169 -0.01979 -0.00394 
wheat -0.02061 0.23692 -0.01979 -0.00394 
corn -0.04123 -0.04337 0.21935 -0.01968 
soybean -0.04123 -0.04337 -0.09893 0.32856 




Table 3. Food/Consumer Demand Elasticity Matrices 
 
     
USA(usa) rice.usa wheat.usa corn.usa soybean.usa 
rice -.066 .003 .016  
wheat .000 -.050 .004  
corn .001 .003 -.059  
soybean     
EU27(eu) rice.eu wheat.eu corn.eu soybean.eu 
rice -.123 .017 .004 .000 
wheat .001 -.053 .000 .000 
corn .001 .001 -.054 .000 
soybean .000 .002 .000 -.055 
Japan(jpn) rice.jpn wheat.jpn corn.jpn soybean.jpn 
rice -.047 .002 .001 .000 
wheat .010 -.056 .000 .000 
corn .016 .002 -.093 .000 
soybean .006 .002 .001 -.175 
Canada(can) rice.can wheat.can corn.can soybean.can 
rice -.045 .006 .002  
wheat .000 -.039 .002  
corn .000 .006 -.043  
soybean     
Mexico(mex) rice.mex wheat.mex corn.mex soybean.mex 
rice -.119 .018 .039  
wheat .001 -.103 .039  
corn .001 .018 -.082  
soybean     
Brail(brz) rice.brz wheat.brz corn.brz soybean.brz 
rice -.074 .011 .003 .000 
wheat .009 -.072 .003 .000 
corn .009 .011 -.079 .000 
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soybean .001 .001 .000 -.062 
Argentina(arg) rice.arg wheat.arg corn.arg soybean.arg 
rice -.065 .011 .004 .000 
wheat .001 -.054 .004 .000 
corn .001 .011 -.062 .000 
soybean .000 .001 .000 -.051 
China(chn) rice.chn wheat.chn corn.chn soybean.chn 
rice -.096 .024 .004 .000 
wheat .014 -.107 .003 .001 
corn .030 .028 -.116 .000 
soybean .002 .001 .000 -.059 
Australia(aus) rice.aus wheat.aus corn.aus soybean.aus 
rice -.040 .007 .000 .000 
wheat .001 -.034 .000 .000 
corn .001 .007 -.041 .000 
soybean .000 .001 .000 -.043 
New Zealand(nzl) rice.nzl wheat.nzl corn.nzl soybean.nzl 
rice     
wheat  -.080 .000  
corn  .006 -.086  
soybean     
South Korean(kor) rice.kor wheat.kor corn.kor soybean.kor 
rice -.054 .007 .004  
wheat .000 -.047 .004  
corn .000 .007 -.050  
soybean     
Rest of the 
World(row) 
rice.row wheat.row corn.row soybean.row 
rice -.128 .055 .012 .000 
wheat .044 -.117 .012 .000 
corn .044 .055 -.160 .000 
soybean .004 .005 .001 -.061 
Source: Generated by the author. 
88 
Table 4. Import Demand and Export Supply Elasticities 
 
 usa eu27 jpn can mex brz arg chn aus nzl kor row 
Rice -0.01 0.76 0.936  0.76 0.76 -0.76 -0.76 -0.76   0.76 
Wheat -0.01 -0.16 0.27 -0.16 0.16    -0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Corn -0.01 0.84  0.84 0.84 -0.84 -0.84 -0.84  0.84  0.84 
Soybean -0.01     -0.245 -0.245 0.245    0.245 




Table 5. General Format of the Matrix of Yield Deviations  
 
 Pattern 1   Pattern 2   … Pattern 100 
2012 2003 Rice .. 1986 Rice ..   
  Wheat ..  Wheat ..   
  Corn ..  Corn ..   
2013 1978 Rice .. 1992 Rice ..   
  Wheat ..  Wheat ..   
  Corn ..  Corn ..   
2014 1990 Rice .. 1966 Rice ..   
  Wheat ..  Wheat ..   
  Corn ..  Corn ..   
2015 1960 Rice .. 1984 Rice ..   
  Wheat ..  Wheat ..   
  Corn ..  Corn ..   
2016 1997 Rice .. 1999 Rice ..   
  Wheat ..  Wheat ..   
  Corn ..  Corn ..   
2017 1989 Rice .. 2010 Rice ..   
  Wheat ..  Wheat ..   
  Corn ..  Corn ..   
2018 2003 Rice .. 1999 Rice ..   
  Wheat ..  Wheat ..   
  Corn ..  Corn ..   
2019 1976 Rice .. 1999 Rice ..   
  Wheat ..  Wheat ..   
  Corn ..  Corn ..   
2020 2001 Rice .. 1987 Rice ..   
  Wheat ..  Wheat ..   
  Corn ..  Corn ..   
Note: The values of all yield deviations are not shown in detail numbers. All the values are in percentage. 
Source: Generated by the author. 
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Table 6. Frequency of Reserving and Releasing of Different Scenario 
 
  95% 5% 95% 20% 80% 20% 80% 40% 
      
rice reserving 52 189 188 369 
 releasing 10 29 84 112 
      
wheat reserving 50 186 190 372 
 releasing 14 28 83 114 
      
corn reserving 49 182 182 369 
 releasing 9 20 67 114 
      
Note: All the values in number of times. 




Table 7. Descriptive Statistics Comparison of Scenarios for Rice 
 
 benchmark   80% 20% 80% 40%   95% 5% 95% 20%  
      
Mean 0.4086 0.4133 0.4235 0.4093 0.4150 
Median 0.4124 0.4128 0.4186 0.4123 0.4133 
Mode 0.3940 0.3990 0.4585 0.4585 0.4585 
Minimum 0.2945 0.3511 0.3789 0.3087 0.3511 
Maximum 0.5137 0.5048 0.5048 0.5137 0.5048 
 
Standard Deviation 0.0492 0.0364 0.0248 0.0473 0.0385 
Sample Variance 0.0024 0.0013 0.0006 0.0022 0.0015 
Range 0.2192 0.1537 0.1259 0.2050 0.1537 
      
Note: Benchmark Scenario is the scenario without activating the IGR. All the values are in dollar per 
kilogram. 




Table 8. Descriptive Statistics Comparison of Scenarios for Wheat 
 
 Benchmark 95% 5%  95% 20%  80% 20%  80% 40%  
      
Mean 0.2107 0.2110 0.2126 0.2118 0.2160 
Median 0.2098 0.2098 0.2103 0.2103 0.2124 
Mode 0.2099 0.2099 0.2132 0.2132 0.2165 
Minimum 0.1502 0.1669 0.1803 0.1803 0.1948 
Maximum 0.2836 0.2792 0.2753 0.2744 0.2744 
 
Standard Deviation 0.0250 0.0242 0.0216 0.0205 0.0147 
Sample Variance 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 0.0002 
Range 0.1333 0.1123 0.0950 0.0941 0.0795 
      
Note: Benchmark Scenario is the scenario without activating the IGR. All the values are in dollar per 
kilogram. 




Table 9. Descriptive Statistics Comparison of Scenarios for Corn 
 
 Benchmark  95% 5% 95% 20%  80% 20%  80% 40%  
      
Mean 0.1721 0.1723 0.1735 0.1729 0.1756 
Median 0.1687 0.1687 0.1691 0.1690 0.1724 
Mode 0.1456 0.1456 0.1555 0.1555 0.1643 
Minimum 0.1313 0.1406 0.1471 0.1471 0.1561 
Maximum 0.2486 0.2486 0.2486 0.2477 0.2460 
 
Standard Deviation 0.0202 0.0197 0.0180 0.0173 0.0139 
Sample Variance 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 
Range 0.1173 0.1080 0.1015 0.1006 0.0899 
      
Note: Benchmark Scenario is the scenario without activating the IGR. All the values are in dollar per 
kilogram. 







Table 10. Comparison of Extreme Price Elimination for Rice 
 
 Benchmark 95% 5% 95% 20% 80% 20% 80% 40% 
      
Percentage over high extreme prices  17.78% 53% 43.89% 63.89% 
MAD of price higher than 95% upper 
bound 
0.0105 0.0099 0.0092 0.0097 0.0061 
Note: Extreme prices are defined as prices which are higher than the 95% upper bound. 




Table 11. Comparison of Extreme Price Elimination for Wheat 
 
 Benchmark 95% 5% 95% 20% 80% 20% 80% 40% 
      
Percentage over high extreme prices  13.33% 46.67% 25.56% 57.78% 
MAD of price higher than 95% upper 
bound 
0.0115 0.0111 0.0091 0.0098 0.0091 
Note: Extreme prices are defined as prices which are higher than the 95% upper bound. 







Table 12. Comparison of Extreme Price Elimination for Corn 
 
 Benchmark 95% 5% 95% 20% 80% 20% 80% 40% 
      
Percentage over high extreme prices  4.44% 18% 20.56% 38.89% 
MAD of price higher than 95% upper 
bound 
0.0148 0.0145 0.0132 0.0133 0.0137 
Note: Extreme prices are defined as prices which are higher than the 95% upper bound. 





Table 13. Quantity of Annual IGR Adjustment 
  95% 5% 95% 20% 80% 20% 80% 40% 
      
max rice 12 32 32 37 
 wheat 36 49 49 64 
 corn 23 52 52 64 
      
min rice -4 -6 -12 -14 
 wheat -14 -22 -37 -39 
 corn -18 -32 -44 -57 
      
average rice 0.2027 1.6909 1.4382 3.7127 
 wheat 0.2955 1.6764 1.1737 5.0691 
 corn 0.3346 1.8282 1.2664 4.3055 
      
Note: All the values are in million metric tons. 




Table 14. Quantity Statistics of Annual IGRS 
 
  95% 5% 95% 20% 80% 20% 80% 40% 
      
max rice 13 71 71 116 
 wheat 44 80 70 180 
 corn 39 114 100 189 
      
min rice 0 0 0 0 
 wheat 0 0 0 0 
 corn 0 0 0 0 
      
average rice 1.1555 8.4327 7.5073 18.2918 
 wheat 1.5073 9.0982 7.1864 27.0473 
 corn 1.74 9.7973 7.7482 23.3664 
      
Note: All the values are in million metric tons. 





Table 15. IGR Cost for Rice of different scenarios 
 
 95% 5% 95% 20% 80% 20% 80% 40% 
annual adjust max 4.0732 12.1463 12.1463 15.4643 
 min -1.9780 -2.8638 -5.4125 -6.3102 
 median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 average 0.0766 0.7562 0.6177 1.8024 
annual storage max 0.2548 1.3916 1.3916 2.2736 
 min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 median 0.0000 0.0980 0.0588 0.3332 
 average 0.0277 0.2020 0.1798 0.4382 
total adjust max 4.0732 24.0583 21.5949 41.4217 
 min -0.4681 -0.2557 -1.3196 -1.1909 
 median 0.0000 6.4883 5.1023 16.4931 
 average 0.6896 6.8057 5.5594 16.2213 
total storage max 1.6072 9.4864 9.3884 14.6216 
 min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 median 0.0000 1.5778 1.4308 3.4300 
 average 0.2491 1.8181 1.6186 3.9437 
total net max 5.0140 33.2937 30.9833 54.8759 
 min -0.3505 -0.0597 -0.6726 -0.0206 
 median 0.0000 7.8231 6.7080 19.5161 
 average 0.9387 8.6238 7.1780 20.1650 
Note: All the values are in billion dollars. 
Source: Generated by the author. 
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Table 16. IGR Cost for Wheat of different scenarios 
 
 95% 5% 95% 20% 80% 20% 80% 40% 
annual adjust max 6.4112 9.6389 9.6389 13.1146 
 min -3.4355 -5.6119 -8.7505 -9.1905 
 median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 average 0.0570 0.3681 0.2252 1.2074 
annual storage max 0.6468 1.1760 1.0290 2.6460 
 min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 median 0.0000 0.0882 0.0294 0.3969 
 average 0.0271 0.1635 0.1291 0.4859 
total adjust max 8.0190 14.6308 12.4785 36.1968 
 min -1.8060 -1.1185 -2.6568 -1.9892 
 median 0.0000 2.9545 1.3070 9.0960 
 average 0.5129 3.3128 2.0264 10.8662 
total storage max 2.5872 5.6595 5.3508 12.7008 
 min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 median 0.0000 1.0952 0.8232 3.8735 
 average 0.2437 1.4712 1.1620 4.3735 
net max 8.9157 18.2220 17.2385 45.2814 
 min -0.9681 -0.6244 -0.6642 -0.3333 
 median 0.0000 4.3020 2.0142 13.4833 
 average 0.7567 4.7840 3.1884 15.2398 
Note: All the values are in billion dollars. 
Source: Generated by the author. 
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Table 17. IGR Cost for Corn of different scenarios 
 
 95% 5% 95% 20% 80% 20% 80% 40% 
annual adjust max 3.4327 8.3337 8.3342 10.7355 
 min -3.7831 -6.8405 -8.3380 -11.1565 
 median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 average 0.0541 0.3344 0.2059 0.8245 
annual storage max 0.6143 1.7955 1.5750 2.9768 
 min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 median 0.0000 0.0473 0.0000 0.2835 
 average 0.0335 0.1886 0.1492 0.4498 
total adjust max 5.6250 17.5580 14.9048 30.4403 
 min -1.3901 -1.9621 -1.9621 -3.0365 
 median 0.0000 1.9462 0.6997 6.5724 
 average 0.4872 3.0095 1.8534 7.4209 
total storage max 2.7090 9.8123 8.5050 15.6240 
 min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 median 0.0000 1.0080 0.7324 3.3548 
 average 0.3015 1.6974 1.3424 4.0482 
net max 8.3340 25.7008 22.6223 46.0643 
 min -0.6745 -1.0486 -1.0486 -1.0363 
 median 0.0000 2.8442 1.3869 9.5584 
 average 0.7887 4.7068 3.1958 11.4691 
Note: All the values are in billion dollars. 
Source: Generated by the author. 
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Table 18. Total cost of different scenarios  
 
 95% 5% 95% 20% 80% 20% 80% 40% 
max 10.9183 53.0472 47.8641 114.2347 
min -1.2872 0.0231 -1.3221 1.8544 
median 2.7693 17.9585 13.6981 47.0755 
average 3.4987 18.2976 13.6991 46.8738 
Note: All the values are in billion dollars. 






Source: FAO Food Situation FAO Food Price Index 03/11/2012. 
 




Source: Hart, C., and B.A. Babcock. 2000. "Time for a New Farmer-Owned Reserve?" Working paper, 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD), Tarzana, Aug. 
 
Figure 2. Annual Corn Prices (Hart 2000)
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Source: Hui, J. 2009. Grain Reserves: Solution to Food Insecurity and Market/Price Instability? 
Washington DC: Office of Global Analysis of Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA, October. 
 






Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: 
Climate Change 2007 (AR4). Geneva. 
 
Figure 4. Trend 1951-2003 contribution from very wet days (IPCC 2007)  
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Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007. IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: 
Climate Change 2007 (AR4). Geneva. 
 
Figure 5. The most important spatial pattern (top) of the  
monthly Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) for 1900 to 2002 (IPCC 2007)  
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Source: Porter, R. S. 1950. "Buffer Stocks and Economic Stability." Oxford Economic Papers, New 
Series, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan., 1950), Oxford University Press, pp. 95-118. 
 
Figure 6. Relationships between Reserve/Release Quantity and Price 
 On a Demand Curve (Porter 1950)
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Source: Porter, R. S. 1950. "Buffer Stocks and Economic Stability." Oxford Economic Papers, New 
Series, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan., 1950), Oxford University Press, pp. 95-118. 
 
Figure 7. Price Band Discussion (Porter 1950)
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Source: Generated by the author. 
 
Figure 8. PEAT-Sim Model Structure
Source: Generated by the author. 
 






Source: Generated by the author. 
 



















Source: Generated by the author. 
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Wheat World Reference Prices










Source: Generated by the author. 
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Rice World Reference Prices












Source: Langley, J.A., R.D. Reinsel, J.A. Craven, J.A. Zellner, and F.J. Nelson. 1985. "Commodity Price 
and Income Support Policies." In Agricultural-Food Policy Review: Commodity Program. 
 
Figure 13. Operation of a hypothetical buffer stock program (Langley 1985)
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Note: “MMT” represents million metric tons. HRW FOB prices represents Hard Red Winter Wheat 
Prices. 
Source: Hui, J. 2009. Grain Reserves: Solution to Food Insecurity and Market/Price Instability? 
Washington DC: Office of Global Analysis of Foreign Agricultural Service/USDA, October. 
 
Figure 14. World price responds to major exporters’ stocks (Hui 2009) 
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Note: “MMT” represents million metric tons. 
Source: Generated by the author. 
 
Figure 15. Inverse Relationship between World Reference Prices  


























Note: “MMT” represents million metric tons. 
Source: Generated by the author. 
 
Figure 16. Inverse Relationship between World Reference Prices  


























Note: “MMT” represents million metric tons. 
Source: Generated by the author. 
 
Figure 17. Inverse Relationship between World Reference Prices  


























Note: all the values are in number of times.  
Source: Generated by the author. 
 















Note: “MMT” represents million metric tons. 
Source: Generated by the author. 
 
















Source: Generated by the author. 
 









































Source: Generated by the author. 
 















Source: Generated by the author. 























Source: Generated by the author. 






















Note: “MMT” represents million metric tons. 
Source: Generated by the author. 







2005 2010 2015 2020






2005 2010 2015 2020













2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018























 Haijing Zhuang graduated from University of Tennessee, Knoxville in August 2012with 
a Master of Science Degree in Agricultural Economics, concentrating in Natural Resource 
Economics, and also with a minor in Statistics. She was a graduate research assistant in the 
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics of UTK from Aug 2010 to Aug 2012. 
 
